Related papers: Budget Feasible Mechanisms on Matroids

In a single-parameter mechanism design problem, a provider is looking to sell a service to a group of potential buyers. Each buyer $i$ has a private value $v_i$ for receiving the service and a feasibility constraint restricts which sets of…

We consider a mechanism design setting with a single item and a single buyer who is uncertain about the value of the item. Both the buyer and the seller have a common model for the buyer's value, but the buyer discovers her true value only…

Motivated by large-market applications such as crowdsourcing, we revisit the problem of budget-feasible mechanism design under a "small-bidder assumption". Anari, Goel, and Nikzad (2018) gave a mechanism that has optimal competitive ratio…

We study mechanisms for selling a single item when buyers have private costs for participating in the mechanism. An agent's participation cost can also be interpreted as an outside option value that she must forego to participate. This…

We consider the problem of budget feasible mechanism design proposed by Singer (2010), but in a Bayesian setting. A principal has a public value for hiring a subset of the agents and a budget, while the agents have private costs for being…

The classical problem of maximizing a submodular function under a matroid constraint is considered. Defining a new measure for the increments made by the greedy algorithm at each step, called the discriminant, improved approximation ratio…

We design novel mechanisms for welfare-maximization in two-sided markets. That is, there are buyers willing to purchase items and sellers holding items initially, both acting rationally and strategically in order to maximize utility. Our…

We revisit the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for allocating divisible items among two agents who have linear utilities, where payments are disallowed and there is no prior information on the agents' preferences. The…

We investigate the power of randomness in the context of a fundamental Bayesian optimal mechanism design problem--a single seller aims to maximize expected revenue by allocating multiple kinds of resources to "unit-demand" agents with…

We introduce the families of solvable and nilpotent matroids, examining their realization spaces, closures, and associated matroid and circuit varieties. We study their realizability, as well as the irreducible decomposition of their…

We improve the efficiency of algorithms for stochastic \emph{combinatorial semi-bandits}. In most interesting problems, state-of-the-art algorithms take advantage of structural properties of rewards, such as \emph{independence}. However,…

In this work, we study sequential contracts under matroid constraints. In the sequential setting, an agent can take actions one by one. After each action, the agent observes the stochastic value of the action and then decides which action…

The budget is the key means for effecting policy in democracies, yet its preparation is typically an excluding, opaque, and arcane process. We aim to rectify this by providing for the democratic creation of complete budgets --- for…

We study the problem of fair allocation of a set of indivisible items among agents with additive valuations, under matroid constraints and two generalizations: $p$-extendible system and independence system constraints. The objective is to…

We consider the problem of finding a basis of a matroid with weight exactly equal to a given target. Here weights can be discrete values from $\{-\Delta,\ldots,\Delta\}$ or more generally $m$-dimensional vectors of such discrete values. We…

This paper is motivated by the fact that many systems need to be maintained continually while the underlying costs change over time. The challenge is to continually maintain near-optimal solutions to the underlying optimization problems,…

Most approaches for designing self-assembled materials focus on the thermodynamic stability of a target structure or crystal polymorph. Yet in practice, the outcome of a self-assembly process is often controlled by kinetic pathways. Here we…

Consider a trade market with one seller and multiple buyers. The seller aims to sell an indivisible item and maximize their revenue. This paper focuses on a simple and popular mechanism--the fixed-price mechanism. Unlike the standard…

In this paper we consider multidimensional mechanism design problem for selling discrete substitutable items to a group of buyers. Previous work on this problem mostly focus on stochastic description of valuations used by the seller.…

Bayesian persuasion is a model for understanding strategic information revelation: an agent with an informational advantage, called a sender, strategically discloses information by sending signals to another agent, called a receiver. In…