Related papers: Mechanism Design for Multi-Type Housing Markets
Matching markets are of particular interest in computer science and economics literature as they are often used to model real-world phenomena where we aim to equitably distribute a limited amount of resources to multiple agents and…
House Allocations concern with matchings involving one-sided preferences, where houses serve as a proxy encoding valuable indivisible resources (e.g. organs, course seats, subsidized public housing units) to be allocated among the agents.…
We study mechanism design in environments where agents have private preferences and private information about a common payoff-relevant state. In such settings with multi-dimensional types, standard mechanisms fail to implement efficient…
Making Smart Cities more sustainable, resilient and democratic is emerging as an endeavor of satisfying hard constraints, for instance meeting net-zero targets. Decentralized multi-agent methods for socio-technical optimization of…
It is often beneficial for agents to pool their resources in order to better accommodate fluctuations in individual demand. Many multi-round resource allocation mechanisms operate in an online manner: in each round, the agents specify their…
We study the envy-free house allocation problem when agents have uncertain preferences over items and consider several well-studied preference uncertainty models. The central problem that we focus on is computing an allocation that has the…
We propose a decentralized market model in which agents can negotiate bilateral contracts. This builds on a similar, but centralized, model of trading networks introduced by Hatfield et al. in 2013. Prior work has established that…
As distributed energy resources (DERs) proliferate, future power system will need new market platforms enabling prosumers to trade various electricity and grid-support products. However, prosumers often exhibit complex, product…
Matching plays a vital role in the rational allocation of resources in many areas, ranging from market operation to people's daily lives. In economics, the term matching theory is coined for pairing two agents in a specific market to reach…
We study mechanisms for an allocation of goods among agents, where agents have no incentive to lie about their true values (incentive compatible) and for which no agent will seek to exchange outcomes with another (envy-free). Mechanisms…
Motivated by applications such as stock exchanges and spectrum auctions, there is a growing interest in mechanisms for arranging trade in two-sided markets. Existing mechanisms are either not truthful, or do not guarantee an…
We study the design of decision-making mechanism for resource allocations over a multi-agent system in a dynamic environment. Agents' privately observed preference over resources evolves over time and the population is dynamic due to the…
This paper gives a theoretical model for design and analysis of mechanisms for online marketplaces where a bidding dashboard enables the bid-optimization of long-lived agents. We assume that a good allocation algorithm exists when given the…
Goods and services -- public housing, medical appointments, schools -- are often allocated to individuals who rank them similarly but differ in their preference intensities. We characterize optimal allocation rules when individual…
Multi-item mechanisms can be very complex offering many different bundles to the buyer that could even be randomized. Such complexity is thought to be necessary as the revenue gaps between randomized and deterministic mechanisms, or…
Reallocating resources to get mutually beneficial outcomes is a fundamental problem in various multi-agent settings. While finding an arbitrary Pareto optimal allocation is generally easy, checking whether a particular allocation is Pareto…
In many applications such as rationing medical care and supplies, university admissions, and the assignment of public housing, the decision of who receives an allocation can be justified by various normative criteria. Such settings have…
AI agents are increasingly transacting on behalf of users -- delegating tasks, spending budgets, and negotiating with unfamiliar counterparties. Unlike human marketplaces, which operate under institutional designs refined over centuries,…
Auctions are markets with strict regulations governing the information available to traders in the market and the possible actions they can take. Since well designed auctions achieve desirable economic outcomes, they have been widely used…
In the real economy, modern decision-making is fundamentally challenged by high-dimensional, multimodal environments, which are further complicated by agent heterogeneity and combinatorial data sparsity. This paper introduces a Multi-Agent…