Related papers: Optimal Pricing for Submodular Valuations with Bou…

CMO Council reports that 71\% of internet users in the U.S. were influenced by coupons and discounts when making their purchase decisions. It has also been shown that offering coupons to a small fraction of users (called seed users) may…

We study individual rational, Pareto optimal, and incentive compatible mechanisms for auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits. For multi-dimensional valuations we show that there can be no deterministic mechanism with these…

In the classical selection problem, the input consists of a collection of elements and the goal is to pick a subset of elements from the collection such that some objective function $f$ is maximized. This problem has been studied…

In this paper, we study sequential auctions with two budget constrained bidders and any number of identical items. All prior results on such auctions consider only two items. We construct a canonical outcome of the auction that is the only…

We study mechanisms for selling a single item when buyers have private costs for participating in the mechanism. An agent's participation cost can also be interpreted as an outside option value that she must forego to participate. This…

We study the revenue maximization problem of a seller with n heterogeneous items for sale to a single buyer whose valuation function for sets of items is unknown and drawn from some distribution D. We show that if D is a distribution over…

Maximizing the revenue from selling _more than one_ good (or item) to a single buyer is a notoriously difficult problem, in stark contrast to the one-good case. For two goods, we show that simple "one-dimensional" mechanisms, such as…

We study combinatorial auctions where each item is sold separately but simultaneously via a second price auction. We ask whether it is possible to efficiently compute in this game a pure Nash equilibrium with social welfare close to the…

We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. The agent's joint distribution of valuations for the two…

When a store sells items to customers, the store wishes to determine the prices of the items to maximize its profit. Intuitively, if the store sells the items with low (resp. high) prices, the customers buy more (resp. less) items, which…

In this work, we consider robust submodular maximization with matroid constraints. We give an efficient bi-criteria approximation algorithm that outputs a small family of feasible sets whose union has (nearly) optimal objective value. This…

We provide a near-optimal, computationally efficient algorithm for the unit-demand pricing problem, where a seller wants to price n items to optimize revenue against a unit-demand buyer whose values for the items are independently drawn…

We present tight bounds and heuristics for personalized, multi-product pricing problems. Under mild conditions we show that the best price in the direction of a positive vector results in profits that are guaranteed to be at least as large…

In this paper, we present the first approximation algorithms for the problem of designing revenue optimal Bayesian incentive compatible auctions when there are multiple (heterogeneous) items and when bidders can have arbitrary demand and…

In robust combinatorial optimization, we would like to find a solution that performs well under all realizations of an uncertainty set of possible parameter values. How we model this uncertainty set has a decisive influence on the…

This letter considers the design of an auction mechanism to sell the object of a seller when the buyers quantize their private value estimates regarding the object prior to communicating them to the seller. The designed auction mechanism…

Classical optimal auction theory assumes that bids reach the seller directly. We study how this picture changes when a revenue-maximizing intermediary controls access to the seller's auction. Motivated by blockchain auctions, online…

This note pursues two primary objectives. First, we analyze the outcomes of an all-pay auction within a store where buyers with and without financial constraints arrive at varying rates, and where buyer types are private information.…

Submodular maximization is a general optimization problem with a wide range of applications in machine learning (e.g., active learning, clustering, and feature selection). In large-scale optimization, the parallel running time of an…

We address the challenging problem of dynamically pricing complementary items that are sequentially displayed to customers. An illustrative example is the online sale of flight tickets, where customers navigate through multiple web pages.…