Related papers: Inferring Fine-grained Control Flow Inside SGX Enc…
Intel SGX and hypervisors isolate non-privileged programs from other software, ensuring confidentiality and integrity. However, side-channel attacks continue to threaten Intel SGX's security, enabling malicious OS to manipulate PTE present…
New hardware primitives such as Intel SGX secure a user-level process in presence of an untrusted or compromised OS. Such "enclaved execution" systems are vulnerable to several side-channels, one of which is the page fault channel. In this…
Forking attacks against TEEs like Intel SGX can be carried out either by rolling back the application to a previous state, or by cloning the application and by partitioning its inputs across the cloned instances. Current solutions to…
Cloud providers are extending support for trusted hardware primitives such as Intel SGX. Simultaneously, the field of deep learning is seeing enormous innovation as well as an increase in adoption. In this paper, we ask a timely question:…
Process-based confidential computing enclaves such as Intel SGX can be used to protect the confidentiality and integrity of workloads, without the overhead of virtualisation. However, they introduce a notable performance overhead,…
The second version of Intel Software Guard Extensions (Intel SGX), or SGX2, adds dynamic management of enclave memory and threads. The first version required the address space and thread counts to be fixed before execution. The Enclave…
Beyond point solutions, the vision of edge computing is to enable web services to deploy their edge functions in a multi-tenant infrastructure present at the edge of mobile networks. However, edge functions can be rendered useless because…
Control-Flow Hijacking attacks are the dominant attack vector against C/C++ programs. Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) solutions mitigate these attacks on the forward edge,i.e., indirect calls through function pointers and virtual calls.…
The Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) technology enables applications to run in an isolated SGX enclave environment, with elevated confidentiality and integrity guarantees. Gramine Library OS facilitates execution of existing unmodified…
Computer systems often provide hardware support for isolation mechanisms like privilege levels, virtual memory, or enclaved execution. Over the past years, several successful software-based side-channel attacks have been developed that…
Transient execution attacks have been one of the widely explored microarchitectural side channels since the discovery of Spectre and Meltdown. However, much of the research has been driven by manual discovery of new transient paths through…
Intel SGX has been a popular trusted execution environment (TEE) for protecting the integrity and confidentiality of applications running on untrusted platforms such as cloud. However, the access patterns of SGX-based programs can still be…
Modern processors use branch prediction and speculative execution to maximize performance. For example, if the destination of a branch depends on a memory value that is in the process of being read, CPUs will try guess the destination and…
User programs recover from hardware exceptions and respond to signals by executing custom handlers that they register specifically for such events. We present SIGY attack, which abuses this programming model on Intel SGX to break the…
Machine learning has become a critical component of modern data-driven online services. Typically, the training phase of machine learning techniques requires to process large-scale datasets which may contain private and sensitive…
Protected-module architectures (PMAs) have been proposed to provide strong isolation guarantees, even on top of a compromised system. Unfortunately, Intel SGX -- the only publicly available high-end PMA -- has been shown to only provide…
Deep learning is gaining importance in many applications. However, Neural Networks face several security and privacy threats. This is particularly significant in the scenario where Cloud infrastructures deploy a service with Neural Network…
We present the design, implementation, and evaluation of FineIBT: a CFI enforcement mechanism that improves the precision of hardware-assisted CFI solutions, like Intel IBT, by instrumenting program code to reduce the valid/allowed targets…
Transient execution attacks that exploit speculation have raised significant concerns in computer systems. Typically, branch predictors are leveraged to trigger mis-speculation in transient execution attacks. In this work, we demonstrate a…
A protocol for two-party secure function evaluation (2P-SFE) aims to allow the parties to learn the output of function $f$ of their private inputs, while leaking nothing more. In a sense, such a protocol realizes a trusted oracle that…