Related papers: Swap Equilibria under Link and Vertex Destruction

Traditional network disruption approaches focus on disconnecting or lengthening paths in the network. We present a new framework for network disruption that attempts to reroute flow through critical vertices via vertex deletion, under the…

We present a new solution concept called evolutionarily stable Stackelberg equilibrium (SESS). We study the Stackelberg evolutionary game setting in which there is a single leading player and a symmetric population of followers. The leader…

Network creation games investigate complex networks from a game-theoretic point of view. Based on the original model by Fabrikant et al. [PODC'03] many variants have been introduced. However, almost all versions have the drawback that edges…

The existence of adversarial examples capable of fooling trained neural network classifiers calls for a much better understanding of possible attacks to guide the development of safeguards against them. This includes attack methods in the…

Scale-free (SF) networks and small world networks have been found to occur in very diverse contexts. It is this striking universality which makes one look for widely applicable mechanisms which lead to the formation of such networks. In…

The problem of worst case edge deletion from a network is considered. Suppose that you have a communication network and you can delete a single edge. Which edge deletion causes the largest disruption? More formally, given a graph, which…

Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is the defining concept of evolutionary game theory. It has a fairly unanimously accepted definition for the case of symmetric games which are played in a homogeneous population where all individuals are…

The study of evolutionary games with pairwise local interactions has been of interest to many different disciplines. Also local interactions with multiple opponents had been considered, although always for a fixed amount of players. In many…

Distributed Support Vector Machines (DSVM) have been developed to solve large-scale classification problems in networked systems with a large number of sensors and control units. However, the systems become more vulnerable as detection and…

We consider the problem of designing network cost-sharing protocols with good equilibria under uncertainty. The underlying game is a multicast game in a rooted undirected graph with nonnegative edge costs. A set of k terminal vertices or…

We study the problem of optimizing a graph-structured objective function under \emph{adversarial} uncertainty. This problem can be modeled as a two-persons zero-sum game between an Engineer and Nature. The Engineer controls a subset of the…

In this paper we present a new competitive packet routing model with edge priorities. We consider players that route selfishly through a network over time and try to reach their destinations as fast as possible. If the number of players who…

This paper investigates strategic interactions within a three party deception security game involving a defender, an insider, and external attackers. We propose a robust deception mechanism where the leader manipulates game parameters…

We introduce a game inspired by the challenges of disease management in livestock farming and the transmission of endemic disease through a trade network. Success in this game comes from balancing the cost of buying new stock with the risk…

Network games provide a powerful framework for modeling agent interactions in networked systems, where players are represented by nodes in a graph and their payoffs depend on the actions taken by their neighbors. Extending the framework of…

We study a multi-type SIR epidemic process among a heterogeneous population that interacts through a network. When we base social contact on a random graph with given vertex degrees, we give limit theorems on the fraction of infected…

Many real-world systems are composed of interdependent networks that rely on one another. Such networks are typically designed and operated by different entities, who aim at maximizing their own payoffs. There exists a game among these…

We consider game-theoretically secure distributed protocols for coalition games that approximate the Shapley value with small multiplicative error. Since all known existing approximation algorithms for the Shapley value are randomized, it…

Modeling and analyzing security of networked systems is an important problem in the emerging Science of Security and has been under active investigation. In this paper, we propose a new approach towards tackling the problem. Our approach is…

Von Neumann founded both game theory and the theory of self-reproducing automata, but the two programs never merged. This paper provides the synthesis. The Theory of Strategic Evolution analyzes strategic replicators: entities that optimize…