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Human cooperation depends on how accurately we infer others' motives--how much they value fairness, generosity, or self-interest from the choices they make. We model that process in binary dictator games, which isolate moral trade-offs…
We introduce a new paradigm for game theory -- Bayesian satisfaction. This novel approach is a synthesis of the idea of Bayesian rationality introduced by Aumann, and satisfaction games. The concept of Bayesian rationality for which, in…
The distributed computation of a Nash equilibrium in aggregative games is gaining increased traction in recent years. Of particular interest is the mediator-free scenario where individual players only access or observe the decisions of…
We investigate the computation of equilibria in extensive-form games where ex ante correlation is possible, focusing on correlated equilibria requiring the least amount of communication between the players and the mediator. Motivated by the…
Unlike Poker where the action space $\mathcal{A}$ is discrete, differential games in the physical world often have continuous action spaces not amenable to discrete abstraction, rendering no-regret algorithms with…
When modeling robot interactions as Nash equilibrium problems, it is desirable to place coupled constraints which restrict these interactions to be safe and acceptable (for instance, to avoid collisions). Such games are continuous with…
Game Theory has been frequently applied in biological research since 1970s. While the key idea of Game Theory is Nash Equilibrium, it is critical to understand and figure out the payoff matrix in order to calculate Nash Equilibrium. In this…
We here study the Battle of the Sexes game, a textbook case of asymmetric games, on small networks. Due to the conflicting preferences of the players, analytical approaches are scarce and most often update strategies are employed in…
This work studies the parameter identification problem of a generalized non-cooperative game, where each player's cost function is influenced by an observable signal and some unknown parameters. We consider the scenario where equilibrium of…
This paper explores distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problems for games in which the players have limited knowledge on other players' actions. In particular, the involved players are considered to be high-order integrators with their…
We study Bayesian coordination games where agents receive noisy private information over the game's payoff structure, and over each others' actions. If private information over actions is precise, we find that agents can coordinate on…
Studying games in the complete information model makes them analytically tractable. However, large $n$ player interactions are more realistically modeled as games of incomplete information, where players may know little to nothing about the…
We consider the problem of learning stable matchings with unknown preferences in a decentralized and uncoordinated manner, where "decentralized" means that players make decisions individually without the influence of a central platform, and…
We study pure Nash equilibria in games on graphs with an imperfect monitoring based on a public signal. In such games, deviations and players responsible for those deviations can be hard to detect and track. We propose a generic epistemic…
In many cases the Nash equilibria are not predictive of the experimental players' behaviour. For some games of Game Theory it is proposed here a method to estimate the probabilities with which the different options will be actually chosen…
Many communication, sensor network, and networked control problems involve agents (decision makers) which have either misaligned objective functions or subjective probabilistic models. In the context of such setups, we consider binary…
We consider the complexity of finding a correlated equilibrium of an $n$-player game in a model that allows the algorithm to make queries on players' payoffs at pure strategy profiles. Randomized regret-based dynamics are known to yield an…
Nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with impulse controls offer a realistic and far-reaching modelling framework for applications within finance, energy markets, and other areas, but the difficulty in solving such problems has…
Evolutionary game theory is a powerful framework for studying evolution in populations of interacting individuals. A common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that interactions are symmetric, which means that the players are…
We introduce a novel class of Nash equilibrium seeking dynamics for non-cooperative games with a finite number of players, where the convergence to the Nash equilibrium is bounded by a KL function with a settling time that can be upper…