Related papers: Computing Equilibria with Partial Commitment

Experimental economics has repeatedly demonstrated that the Nash equilibrium makes inaccurate predictions for a vast set of games. Instead, several alternative theoretical concepts predict behavior that is much more in tune with observed…

We propose a distributed algorithm to compute an equilibrium in aggregate games where players communicate over a fixed undirected network. Our algorithm exploits correlated perturbation to obfuscate information shared over the network. We…

In this paper, we consider a discrete-time stochastic Stackelberg game with a single leader and multiple followers. Both the followers and the leader together have conditionally independent private types, conditioned on action and previous…

Consider a set of agents who play a network game repeatedly. Agents may not know the network. They may even be unaware that they are interacting with other agents in a network. Possibly, they just understand that their payoffs depend on an…

While Nash equilibria are guaranteed to exist, they may exhibit dense support, making them difficult to understand and execute in some applications. In this paper, we study $k$-sparse commitments in games where one player is restricted to…

An analysis of several important aspects of competition or conflict in games, social choice and decision theory is presented. Inherent difficulties and complexities in cooperation are highlighted. These have over the years led to a certain…

In many game-theoretic settings, agents are challenged with taking decisions against the uncertain behavior exhibited by others. Often, this uncertainty arises from multiple sources, e.g., incomplete information, limited computation,…

Public goods games study the incentives of individuals to contribute to a public good and their behaviors in equilibria. In this paper, we examine a specific type of public goods game where players are networked and each has binary actions,…

A Stackelberg game is played between a leader and a follower. The leader first chooses an action, then the follower plays his best response. The goal of the leader is to pick the action that will maximize his payoff given the follower's…

The stag hunt (or assurance game) is a simple game that has been used as a prototype of a variety of social coordination problems (ranging from the social contract to the adoption of technical standards). Players have the option to either…

Conventional noncooperative game theory hypothesizes that the joint strategy of a set of players in a game must satisfy an "equilibrium concept". All other joint strategies are considered impossible; the only issue is what equilibrium…

This paper characterizes optimal classification when individuals adjust their behavior in response to the classification rule. We model the interaction between a designer and a population as a Stackelberg game: the designer selects a…

Stackelberg Security Games (SSGs) have been adopted widely for modeling adversarial interactions. With increasing size of the applications of SSGs, scalability of equilibrium computation is an important research problem. While prior…

Under certain assumptions in terms of information and models, equilibria correspond to possible stable outcomes in conflicting or cooperative scenarios where rational entities interact. For wireless engineers, it is of paramount importance…

In game theory, a trusted mediator acting on behalf of the players can enable the attainment of correlated equilibria, which may provide better payoffs than those available from the Nash equilibria alone. We explore the approach of…

This paper studies the synthesis of control policies for an agent that has to satisfy a temporal logic specification in a partially observable environment, in the presence of an adversary. The interaction of the agent (defender) with the…

We consider a general class of finite-player stochastic games with mean-field interaction, in which the linear-quadratic cost functional includes linear operators acting on controls in $L^2$. We propose a novel approach for deriving the…

We study a two-player Stackelberg game with incomplete information such that the follower's strategy belongs to a known family of parameterized functions with an unknown parameter vector. We design an adaptive learning approach to…

Safety is critical during human-robot interaction. But -- because people are inherently unpredictable -- it is often difficult for robots to plan safe behaviors. Instead of relying on our ability to anticipate humans, here we identify robot…

This work proposes a novel distributed approach for computing a Nash equilibrium in convex games with restricted strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. By leveraging the idea of the centralized operator extrapolation method presented in [4] to…