Related papers: Cooperation driven by success-driven group formati…

Cooperation often depends on individuals avoiding exploitation and interacting preferentially with other cooperators. We explore how context-dependent migration influences the evolution of cooperation in spatially structured populations.…

This paper discusses the role of opportunistic punisher who may act selfishly to free-ride cooperators or not to be exploited by defectors. To consider opportunistic punisher, we make a change to the sequence of one-shot public good game;…

We consider the coupled dynamics of the adaption of network structure and the evolution of strategies played by individuals occupying the network vertices. We propose a computational model in which each agent plays a $n$-round Prisoner's…

We study a model of traffic where drivers adopt different behavioral strategies. These can be cooperative or defective according to a driver abiding or not by a traffic rule. Drivers can change their strategy by imitating the majority, with…

We study the evolution of cooperation in the collective-risk social dilemma game, where the risk is determined by a collective target that must be reached with individual contributions. All players initially receive endowments from the…

Reputation and punishment are significant guidelines for regulating individual behavior in human society, and those with a good reputation are more likely to be imitated by others. In addition, society imposes varying degrees of punishment…

Properly coordinating cooperation is relevant for resolving public good problems such as clean energy and environmental protection. However, little is known about how individuals can coordinate themselves for a certain level of cooperation…

A local agglomeration of cooperators can support the survival or spreading of cooperation, even when cooperation is predicted to die out according to the replicator equation, which is often used in evolutionary game theory to study the…

Deliberate deceptiveness intended to gain an advantage is commonplace in human and animal societies. In a social dilemma, an individual may only pretend to be a cooperator to elicit cooperation from others, while in reality he is a…

In spatial evolutionary games the fitness of each individual is traditionally determined by the payoffs it obtains upon playing the game with its neighbors. Since defection yields the highest individual benefits, the outlook for cooperators…

Public Goods Games represent one of the most useful tools to study group interactions between individuals. However, even if they could provide an explanation for the emergence and stability of cooperation in modern societies, they are not…

Previous research has highlighted the importance of strong heterogeneity for the successful evolution of cooperation in games governed by pairwise interactions. Here we determine to what extent this is true for games governed by group…

Cooperation within asymmetric populations has garnered significant attention in evolutionary games. This paper explores cooperation evolution in populations with weak and strong players, using a game model where players choose between…

A greedy personality is usually accompanied by arrogance and confidence. This work investigates the cooperation success condition in the context of biased payoff allocation and self-confidence. The first component allows the organizer in a…

The basic problem in the cooperation theory is to justify the cooperation. Here we propose a new approach, where players are driven by their altruism to cooperate or not. The probability of cooperation depends also on the co-player's…

We study the evolution of cooperation in public goods games on different regular graphs as a function of the noise level underlying strategy adoptions. We focus on the effects that are brought about by different group sizes of public goods…

The promise of punishment and reward in promoting public cooperation is debatable. While punishment is traditionally considered more successful than reward, the fact that the cost of punishment frequently fails to offset gains from enhanced…

Studying social dilemmas prompts the question of how cooperation can emerge in situations where individuals are expected to act selfishly. Here, in the framework of the one-shot Public Goods Game (PGG), we introduce the concept that…

The public goods game is a famous example illustrating the tragedy of the commons. In this game cooperating individuals contribute to a pool, which in turn is distributed to all members of the group, including defectors who reap the same…

How evolution favors cooperation is a fundamental issue in social and economic systems. In the business world, actively selecting a suitable project is usually helpful for a businessman to be in an advantageous position. By incorporating…