Related papers: A two player zerosum game where only one player ob…
In this paper, we formulate a two-player zero-sum game under dynamic constraints defined by hybrid dynamical equations. The game consists of a min-max problem involving a cost functional that depends on the actions and resulting solutions…
We study a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game with asymmetric information where the payoff depends on a controlled continuous-time Markov chain X with finite state space which is only observed by player 1. This model was…
We investigate a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game in which the players have an asymmetric information on the random payoff. We prove that the game has a value and characterize this value in terms of dual solutions of some…
We consider a zero sum differential game with lack of observation on one side. The initial state of the system is drawn at random according to some probability $\mu_0$ on $\R^N$. Player-I is informed of the initial position of state while…
This paper considers the problem of two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game with both players adopting impulse controls in finite horizon under rather weak assumptions on the cost functions ($c$ and $\chi$ not decreasing in time).…
This paper presents Hamilton-Jacobi (HJ) formulations for two classes of two-player zero-sum games: one with a maximum cost value over time, and one with a minimum cost value over time. In the zero-sum game setting, player A minimizes the…
This paper considers a two-person zero-sum continuous-time Markov pure jump game in Borel state and action spaces over a fixed finite horizon. The main assumption on the model is the existence of a drift function, which bounds the reward…
We study two-player zero-sum stopping games in continuous time and infinite horizon. We prove that the value in randomized stopping times exists as soon as the payoff processes are right-continuous. In particular, as opposed to existing…
We analyze a two-player, nonzero-sum Dynkin game of stopping with incomplete information. We assume that each player observes his own Brownian motion, which is not only independent of the other player's Brownian motion but also not…
In this paper we introduce a new two-player zero-sum game whose value function approximates the level set formulation for the geometric evolution by mean curvature of a hypersurface. In our approach the game is played with symmetric rules…
We consider discrete time partially observable zero-sum stochastic game with average payoff criterion. We study the game using an equivalent completely observable game. We show that the game has a value and also we come up with a pair of…
We consider a general nonzero-sum impulse game with two players. The main mathematical contribution of the paper is a verification theorem which provides, under some regularity conditions, a suitable system of quasi-variational inequalities…
We consider a two-player zero-sum game with integral payoff and with incomplete information on one side, where the payoff is chosen among a continuous set of possible payoffs. We prove that the value function of this game is solution of an…
We study a two-player, zero-sum, dynamic game with incomplete information where one of the players is more informed than his opponent. We analyze the limit value as the players play more and more frequently. The more informed player…
We study a two-player, zero-sum, stochastic game with incomplete information on one side in which the players are allowed to play more and more frequently. The informed player observes the realization of a Markov chain on which the payoffs…
We consider a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game in which one of the players has a private information on the game. Both players observe each other, so that the non-informed player can try to guess his missing information. Our…
In this paper, $2\times2$ zero-sum games are studied under the following assumptions: $(1)$ One of the players (the leader) commits to choose its actions by sampling a given probability measure (strategy); $(2)$ The leader announces its…
In this paper we study continuous-time two-player zero-sum optimal switching games on a finite horizon. Using the theory of doubly reflected BSDEs with interconnected barriers, we show that this game has a value and an equilibrium in the…
This paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of solutions for two-person zero-sum games with inf/sup-compact payoff functions and with possibly noncompact decision sets for both players. Payoff functions may be unbounded, and…
We prove that for a class of zero-sum differential games with incomplete information on both sides, the value admits a probabilistic representation as the value of a zero-sum stochastic differential game with complete information, where…