Related papers: Waterfiling: Balancing the Tor network with maximu…
Flow correlation is the core technique used in a multitude of deanonymization attacks on Tor. Despite the importance of flow correlation attacks on Tor, existing flow correlation techniques are considered to be ineffective and unreliable in…
Tor, a widely utilized privacy network, enables anonymous communication but is vulnerable to flow correlation attacks that deanonymize users by correlating traffic patterns from Tor's ingress and egress segments. Various defenses have been…
Deciding that two network flows are essentially the same is an important problem in intrusion detection and in tracing anonymous connections. A stepping stone or an anonymity network may try to prevent flow correlation by adding chaff…
The network flow watermarking technique associates the two communicating parties by actively modifying certain characteristics of the stream generated by the sender so that it covertly carries some special marking information. Some curious…
In this paper, a new routing algorithm based on a flooding method is introduced. Flooding techniques have been used previously, e.g. for broadcasting the routing table in the ARPAnet [1] and other special purpose networks [3][4][5].…
The Tor network is the most prominent system for providing anonymous communication to web users, with a daily user base of 2 million users. However, since its inception, it has been constantly targeted by various traffic fingerprinting and…
Users of the Tor anonymity system suffer from lessthan- ideal performance, in part because circuit building and selection processes are not tuned for speed. In this paper, we examine both the process of selecting among pre-built circuits…
The Tor network uses a measurement system to estimate its relays' forwarding capacity and to balance traffic among them. This system has been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial manipulation. Moreover, its accuracy and effectiveness in…
The Tor anonymity network has been shown vulnerable to traffic analysis attacks by autonomous systems and Internet exchanges, which can observe different overlay hops belonging to the same circuit. We aim to determine whether network path…
Tor is a widely used anonymity network that conceals user identities by routing traffic through encrypted relays, yet it remains vulnerable to traffic correlation attacks that deanonymize users by matching patterns in ingress and egress…
Flow correlation attacks is an efficient network attacks, aiming to expose those who use anonymous network services, such as Tor. Conducting such attacks during the early stages of network communication is particularly critical for…
Online anonymity and privacy has been based on confusing the adversary by creating indistinguishable network elements. Tor is the largest and most widely deployed anonymity system, designed against realistic modern adversaries. Recently,…
Tor provides anonymity online by routing traffic through encrypted tunnels, called circuits, over paths of anonymizing relays. To enable users to connect to their selected destination servers without waiting for the circuit to be build, the…
The Tor network provides users with strong anonymity by routing their internet traffic through multiple relays. While Tor encrypts traffic and hides IP addresses, it remains vulnerable to traffic analysis attacks such as the website…
Allocation of dynamically-arriving (i.e., online) divisible resources among a set of offline agents is a fundamental problem, with applications to online marketplaces, scheduling, portfolio selection, signal processing, and many other…
The Tor anonymous network has become quite popular with regular users on the Internet. In the Tor network, an anonymous path is created by selecting three relays through which the connection is redirected. Nevertheless, as the number of Tor…
In this paper, we analyze several recent schemes for watermarking network flows that are based on splitting the flow into timing intervals. We show that this approach creates time-dependent correlations that enable an attack that combines…
Anonymity systems such as Tor aim to enable users to communicate in a manner that is untraceable by adversaries that control a small number of machines. To provide efficient service to users, these anonymity systems make full use of…
Tor users are vulnerable to deanonymization by an adversary that can observe some Tor relays or some parts of the network. We demonstrate that previous network-aware path-selection algorithms that propose to solve this problem are…
Anonymous communication systems are subject to selective denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Selective DoS attacks lower anonymity as they force paths to be rebuilt multiple times to ensure delivery which increases the opportunity for more…