Related papers: Sample Complexity for Non-Truthful Mechanisms

Recently, there has been a number of papers relating mechanism design and privacy (e.g., see \cite{MT07,Xia11,CCKMV11,NST12,NOS12,HK12}). All of these papers consider a worst-case setting where there is no probabilistic information about…

It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true: creating a randomized truthful mechanism is essentially as easy as a…

We present and discuss general techniques for proving inapproximability results for truthful mechanisms. We make use of these techniques to prove lower bounds on the approximability of several non-utilitarian multi-parameter problems. In…

We study a budget-aggregation setting in which a number of voters report their ideal distribution of a budget over a set of alternatives, and a mechanism aggregates these reports into an allocation. Ideally, such mechanisms are truthful,…

Recent work has constructed economic mechanisms that are both truthful and differentially private. In these mechanisms, privacy is treated separately from the truthfulness; it is not incorporated in players' utility functions (and doing so…

We study the power of polynomial-time truthful mechanisms comparing to polynomial time (non-truthful) algorithms. We show that there is a setting in which deterministic polynomial-time truthful mechanisms cannot guarantee a bounded…

It is typically expected that if a mechanism is truthful, then the agents would, indeed, truthfully report their private information. But why would an agent believe that the mechanism is truthful? We wish to design truthful mechanisms,…

We characterize the communication complexity of truthful mechanisms. Our departure point is the well known taxation principle. The taxation principle asserts that every truthful mechanism can be interpreted as follows: every player is…

Mechanism design is addressed in the context of fair allocations of indivisible goods with monetary compensation. Motivated by a real-world social choice problem, mechanisms with verification are considered in a setting where (i) agents'…

We study the mechanism design problem of allocating a set of indivisible items without monetary transfers. Despite the vast literature on this very standard model, it still remains unclear how do truthful mechanisms look like. We focus on…

We introduce and study strongly truthful mechanisms and their applications. We use strongly truthful mechanisms as a tool for implementation in undominated strategies for several problems,including the design of externality resistant…

We consider a task of scheduling with a common deadline on a single machine. Every player reports to a scheduler the length of his job and the scheduler needs to finish as many jobs as possible by the deadline. For this simple problem,…

We study the problem of automated mechanism design with partial verification, where each type can (mis)report only a restricted set of types (rather than any other type), induced by the principal's limited verification power. We prove…

In many settings the power of truthful mechanisms is severely bounded. In this paper we use randomization to overcome this problem. In particular, we construct an FPTAS for multi-unit auctions that is truthful in expectation, whereas there…

Mathematical models are invaluable for understanding and predicting how biological systems behave, although their construction requires specifying mechanisms and relationships that are often not perfectly known. In the presence of multiple…

We study minimal single-task peer prediction mechanisms that have limited knowledge about agents' beliefs. Without knowing what agents' beliefs are or eliciting additional information, it is not possible to design a truthful mechanism in a…

A rapidly growing literature on lying in behavioral economics and psychology shows that individuals often do not lie even when lying maximizes their utility. In this work, we attempt to incorporate these findings into the theory of…

Multi-item mechanisms can be very complex offering many different bundles to the buyer that could even be randomized. Such complexity is thought to be necessary as the revenue gaps between randomized and deterministic mechanisms, or…

In this paper we show that payment computation essentially does not present any obstacle in designing truthful mechanisms, even for multi-parameter domains, and even when we can only call the allocation rule once. We present a general…

This paper considers prior-independent mechanism design, in which a single mechanism is designed to achieve approximately optimal performance on every prior distribution from a given class. Most results in this literature focus on…