Related papers: Strategies with Parallel Causes
The spread of new ideas, behaviors or technologies has been extensively studied using epidemic models. Here we consider a model of diffusion where the individuals' behavior is the result of a strategic choice. We study a simple coordination…
We introduce parallelism into the basic algebra of games to model concurrent game algebraically. Parallelism is treated as a new kind of game operation. The resulted algebra of concurrent games can be used widely to reason the parallel…
We define a game on distributed Petri nets, where several players interact with each other, and with an environment. The players, or users, have perfect knowledge of the current state, and pursue a common goal. Such goal is expressed by…
In multi-agent settings, game theory is a natural framework for describing the strategic interactions of agents whose objectives depend upon one another's behavior. Trajectory games capture these complex effects by design. In competitive…
We consider the problem of routing for logistics purposes, in a contested environment where an adversary attempts to disrupt the vehicle along the chosen route. We construct a game-theoretic model that captures the problem of optimal…
We first present a probabilistic version of ACP that rests on the principle that probabilistic choices are always resolved before choices involved in alternative composition and parallel composition are resolved and then extend this…
This paper deals with the probabilistic behaviours of distributed systems described by a process calculus considering both probabilistic internal choices and nondeterministic external choices. For this calculus we define and study a typing…
Distributed decision-makers are modeled as players in a game with two levels. High level decisions concern the game environment and determine the willingness of the players to form a coalition (or group). Low level decisions involve the…
Graph games of infinite length are a natural model for open reactive processes: one player represents the controller, trying to ensure a given specification, and the other represents a hostile environment. The evolution of the system…
Evolution of distribution of strategies in game theory is an interesting question that has been studied only for specific cases. Here I develop a general method to extend analysis of the evolution of continuous strategy distributions given…
As Aumann stated, cooperation and non-cooperation are different ways of viewing the same game, with the main difference being whether players can reach a binding cooperative agreement. In the real world, many games often coexist competition…
In this paper, we study the notion of admissibility for randomised strategies in concurrent games. Intuitively, an admissible strategy is one where the player plays `as well as possible', because there is no other strategy that dominates…
Teams frequently compete on multiple fronts: political parties contest districts for majority control, contractors field specialized units to win procurement contracts, and squads play match by match for titles. Although the prize accrues…
Two-player games on finite graphs provide a rigorous foundation for modeling the strategic interaction between reactive systems and their environment. While concurrent game semantics naturally capture the synchronous interactions…
This paper focuses on "tracing player knowledge" in educational games. Specifically, given a set of concepts or skills required to master a game, the goal is to estimate the likelihood with which the current player has mastery of each of…
When a game involves many agents or when communication between agents is not possible, it is useful to resort to distributed learning where each agent acts in complete autonomy without any information on the other agents' situations.…
When modeling robot interactions as Nash equilibrium problems, it is desirable to place coupled constraints which restrict these interactions to be safe and acceptable (for instance, to avoid collisions). Such games are continuous with…
Involution now refers to the phenomenon that competitors in the same field make more efforts to struggle for limited resources but get lower individual ''profit effort ratio''. In this work, we investigate the evolution of the involution…
We consider multi-player games played on graphs, in which the players aim at fulfilling their own (not necessarily antagonistic) objectives. In the spirit of evolutionary game theory, we suppose that the players have the right to repeatedly…
In repeated-game applications where both the collusive and non-collusive outcomes can be supported as equilibria, researchers must resolve underlying selection questions if theory will be used to understand counterfactual policies. One…