Related papers: Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic Ag…
In this work, we investigate an application of a Nash equilibrium seeking algorithm in a social network. In a networked game each player (user) takes action in response to other players' actions in order to decrease (increase) his cost…
Due to the lack of coordination, it is unlikely that the selfish players of a strategic game reach a socially good state. A possible way to cope with selfishness is to compute a desired outcome (if it is tractable) and impose it. However…
As is well known, many classes of markets have efficient equilibria, but this depends on agents being non-strategic, i.e. that they declare their true demands when offered goods at particular prices, or in other words, that they are…
A public decision-making problem consists of a set of issues, each with multiple possible alternatives, and a set of competing agents, each with a preferred alternative for each issue. We study adaptations of market economies to this…
In a 2017 paper, later presented at the Web and Internet Economics conference, titled ``Sequential Deliberation for Social Choice", the authors propose a mechanism in which a series of agents, are tasked to negotiate over a set of decisions…
We study the fair division problem of allocating multiple resources among a set of agents with Leontief preferences that are each required to complete a finite amount of work, which we term "limited demands". We examine the behavior of the…
We present a constant-factor approximation algorithm for the Nash social welfare maximization problem with subadditive valuations accessible via demand queries. More generally, we propose a template for NSW optimization by solving a…
We address the Nash equilibrium problem in a partial-decision information scenario, where each agent can only observe the actions of some neighbors, while its cost possibly depends on the strategies of other agents. Our main contribution is…
The $\alpha$-fair resource allocation problem has received remarkable attention and has been studied in numerous application fields. Several algorithms have been proposed in the context of $\alpha$-fair resource sharing to distributively…
In the electricity market, it is quite common that the market participants make "selfish" strategies to harvest the maximum profits for themselves, which may cause the social benefit loss and impair the sustainability of the society in the…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to agents with weights corresponding to their entitlements. Previous work has shown that, when agents have binary additive valuations, the maximum weighted Nash welfare rule is…
Auctions are modeled as Bayesian games with continuous type and action spaces. Determining equilibria in auction games is computationally hard in general and no exact solution theory is known. We introduce an algorithmic framework in which…
Proportional dynamics, originated from peer-to-peer file sharing systems, models a decentralized price-learning process in Fisher markets. Previously, items in the dynamics operate independently of one another, and each is assumed to belong…
Fair allocation of indivisible goods studies allocating $m$ goods among $n$ agents in a fair manner. While fairness is a fundamental requirement in many real-world applications, it often conflicts with (economic) efficiency. This raises a…
We study surplus division in network constrained bilateral matching markets with transferable utility. We introduce a new solution concept, the credible bargaining solution, which refines stability by requiring that, for each matched pair…
We introduce a new measure of the discrepancy in strategic games between the social welfare in a Nash equilibrium and in a social optimum, that we call selfishness level. It is the smallest fraction of the social welfare that needs to be…
We consider a multi-agent model for fair division of mixed manna (i.e. items for which agents can have positive, zero or negative utilities), in which agents have additive utilities for bundles of items. For this model, we give several…
Generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) problems are commonly used to model strategic interactions between self-interested agents who are coupled in cost and constraints. Specifically, the variational GNE, a refinement of the GNE, is often…
We generalize the classic problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to the problem of \emph{fair public decision making}, in which a decision must be made on several social issues simultaneously, and, unlike the classic setting, a…
We introduce a strategic behavior in reinsurance bilateral transactions, where agents choose the risk preferences they will appear to have in the transaction. Within a wide class of risk measures, we identify agents' strategic choices to a…