Related papers: Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic Ag…
Frequent violations of fair principles in real-life settings raise the fundamental question of whether such principles can guarantee the existence of a self-enforcing equilibrium in a free economy. We show that elementary principles of…
We study Fisher markets and the problem of maximizing the Nash social welfare (NSW), and show several closely related new results. In particular, we obtain: -- A new integer program for the NSW maximization problem whose fractional…
According to the proportional allocation mechanism from the network optimization literature, users compete for a divisible resource -- such as bandwidth -- by submitting bids. The mechanism allocates to each user a fraction of the resource…
For any $\varepsilon>0$, we give a simple, deterministic $(4+\varepsilon)$-approximation algorithm for the Nash social welfare (NSW) problem under submodular valuations. We also consider the asymmetric variant of the problem, where the…
Within a common arbitrage-free semimartingale financial market we consider the problem of determining all Nash equilibrium investment strategies for $n$ agents who try to maximize the expected utility of their relative wealth. The utility…
The maximum Nash social welfare (NSW) -- which maximizes the geometric mean of agents' utilities -- is a fundamental solution concept with remarkable fairness and efficiency guarantees. The computational aspects of NSW have been extensively…
This paper is merged with arXiv:2107.08965v2. We refer the reader to the full and updated version. We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with 2-value additive valuations. Our goal is to find an…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among agents that have an identical subadditive valuation over the goods. The extent of fairness and efficiency of allocations is measured by the generalized means of the values that the…
We study the problem of fair allocation of a set of indivisible items among agents with additive valuations, under matroid constraints and two generalizations: $p$-extendible system and independence system constraints. The objective is to…
We study markets of indivisible items in which price-based (Walrasian) equilibria often do not exist due to the discrete non-convex setting. Instead we consider Nash equilibria of the market viewed as a game, where players bid for items,…
In uniform-price markets, suppliers compete to supply a resource to consumers, resulting in a single market price determined by their competition. For sufficient flexibility, producers and consumers prefer to commit to a function as their…
We consider the bilateral trade problem, in which two agents trade a single indivisible item. It is known that the only dominant-strategy truthful mechanism is the fixed-price mechanism: given commonly known distributions of the buyer's…
We study fair division of indivisible goods in a single-parameter environment. In particular, we develop truthful social welfare maximizing mechanisms for fairly allocating indivisible goods. Our fairness guarantees are in terms of solution…
We study the problem of approximating maximum Nash social welfare (NSW) when allocating m indivisible items among n asymmetric agents with submodular valuations. The NSW is a well-established notion of fairness and efficiency, defined as…
We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility…
We establish a compatibility between fairness and efficiency, captured via Nash Social Welfare (NSW), under the broad class of subadditive valuations. We prove that, for subadditive valuations, there always exists a partial allocation that…
Reinforcement learning has been shown to be an effective strategy for automatically training policies for challenging control problems. Focusing on non-cooperative multi-agent systems, we propose a novel reinforcement learning framework for…
We study the allocation of divisible goods to competing agents via a market mechanism, focusing on agents with Leontief utilities. The majority of the economics and mechanism design literature has focused on \emph{linear} prices, meaning…
We investigate stochastic differential games of optimal trading comprising a finite population. There are market frictions in the present framework, which take the form of stochastic permanent and temporary price impacts. Moreover,…
In this report we construct two mechanisms that fully implement social welfare maximising allocation in Nash equilibria for the case of a single infinitely divisible good subject to multiple inequality constraints. The first mechanism…