Related papers: Do players reason by forward induction in dynamic …
We study experimentally contests in which players make investment decisions sequentially, and information on prior investments is revealed between stages. Using a between-subject design, we consider all possible sequences in contests of…
We introduce a class of extensive form games where players might not be able to foresee the possible consequences of their decisions and form a model of their opponents which they exploit to achieve a more profitable outcome. We improve…
Learning models do not in general imply that weakly dominated strategies are irrelevant or justify the related concept of "forward induction," because rational agents may use dominated strategies as experiments to learn how opponents play,…
It is shown in recent studies that in a Stackelberg game the follower can manipulate the leader by deviating from their true best-response behavior. Such manipulations are computationally tractable and can be highly beneficial for the…
Reaction time studies with computers investigate how and how quickly participants respond to changing sensory input. They promise simple and precise measurement of time and inputs and offer interesting insights into human behavior. However,…
Human decision behaviour is quite diverse. In many games humans on average do not achieve maximal payoff and the behaviour of individual players remains inhomogeneous even after playing many rounds. For instance, in repeated prisoner…
People can evaluate features of problems and their potential solutions well before we can effectively solve them. When considering a game we have never played, for instance, we might infer whether it is likely to be challenging, fair, or…
Intention recognition is an important characteristic of intelligent agents. In their interactions with others, they try to read others' intentions and make an image of others to choose their actions accordingly. While the way in which…
The rational solution of the Monty Hall problem unsettles many people. Most people, including the authors, think it feels wrong to switch the initial choice of one of the three doors, despite having fully accepted the mathematical proof for…
Consider a persuasion game where both the sender and receiver are ambiguity averse with maxmin expected utility (MEU) preferences and the sender can choose an ambiguous information structure. This paper analyzes the game in an ex-ante…
What happen in the brain when human beings play games with computers? Here a simple zero-sum game was conducted to investigate how people make decision via their brain even they know that their opponent is a computer. There are two choices…
We study security threats to Markov games due to information asymmetry and misinformation. We consider an attacker player who can spread misinformation about its reward function to influence the robust victim player's behavior. Given a…
There is a common belief that humans and many animals follow transitive inference (choosing A over C on the basis of knowing that A is better than B and B is better than C). Transitivity seems to be the essence of rational choice. We…
Information uncertainty is one of the major challenges facing applications of game theory. In the context of Stackelberg games, various approaches have been proposed to deal with the leader's incomplete knowledge about the follower's…
We add the assumption that players know their opponents' payoff functions and rationality to a model of non-equilibrium learning in signaling games. Agents are born into player roles and play against random opponents every period.…
This paper explores the use of Generative Pre-trained Transformers (GPT) in strategic game experiments, specifically the ultimatum game and the prisoner's dilemma. I designed prompts and architectures to enable GPT to understand the game…
Biological systems often choose actions without an explicit reward signal, a phenomenon known as intrinsic motivation. The computational principles underlying this behavior remain poorly understood. In this study, we investigate an…
How do incentive levels affect strategic behaviour? We address this with an experiment that separately identifies own- and opponent-incentive effects in two dominance-solvable games that differ in strategic complexity. Higher own incentives…
When learning to play an imperfect information game, it is often easier to first start with the basic mechanics of the game rules. For example, one can play several example rounds with private cards revealed to all players to better…
In the last years, the DeepMind algorithm AlphaZero has become the state of the art to efficiently tackle perfect information two-player zero-sum games with a win/lose outcome. However, when the win/lose outcome is decided by a final score…