Related papers: Bayesian Games with Intentions
We study a model of strategic coordination based on a class of games with incomplete information known as Global Games. Under the assumption of Poisson-distributed signals and a Gamma prior distribution on state of the system, we…
When modeling robot interactions as Nash equilibrium problems, it is desirable to place coupled constraints which restrict these interactions to be safe and acceptable (for instance, to avoid collisions). Such games are continuous with…
Stochastic games are a convenient formalism for modelling systems that comprise rational agents competing or collaborating within uncertain environments. Probabilistic model checking techniques for this class of models allow us to formally…
Nash equilibrium is the most commonly-used notion of equilibrium in game theory. However, it suffers from numerous problems. Some are well known in the game theory community; for example, the Nash equilibrium of repeated prisoner's dilemma…
We consider a class of Wasserstein distributionally robust Nash equilibrium problems, where agents construct heterogeneous data-driven Wasserstein ambiguity sets using private samples and radii, in line with their individual risk-averse…
Game theory has emerged as a powerful framework for modeling a large range of multi-agent scenarios. Many algorithmic solutions require discrete, finite games with payoffs that have a closed-form specification. In contrast, many real-world…
We introduce the LLM-Nash framework, a game-theoretic model where agents select reasoning prompts to guide decision-making via Large Language Models (LLMs). Unlike classical games that assume utility-maximizing agents with full rationality,…
We present a subjective equilibrium notion (called "subjective equilibrium under beliefs of exogenous uncertainty (SEBEU)" for stochastic dynamic games in which each player chooses her decisions under the (incorrect) belief that a…
Mean field games are limit models for symmetric $N$-player games with interaction of mean field type as $N\to\infty$. The limit relation is often understood in the sense that a solution of a mean field game allows to construct approximate…
We introduce a new measure of the discrepancy in strategic games between the social welfare in a Nash equilibrium and in a social optimum, that we call selfishness level. It is the smallest fraction of the social welfare that needs to be…
This paper presents a general closed graph property for (randomized strategy) Nash equilibrium correspondence in large games. In particular, we show that for any large game with a convergent sequence of fiinite-player games, the limit of…
We study a very general class of games --- multi-dimensional aggregative games --- which in particular generalize both anonymous games and weighted congestion games. For any such game that is also large, we solve the equilibrium selection…
A Bayesian player acting in an infinite multi-player game learns to predict the other players' strategies if his prior assigns positive probability to their play (or contains a grain of truth). Kalai and Lehrer's classic grain of truth…
We consider solutions of normal form games that are invariant under strategic equivalence. We consider additional properties that can be expected (or be desired) from a solution of a game, and we observe the following: - Even the weakest…
We introduce a new class of context dependent, incomplete information games to serve as structured prediction models for settings with significant strategic interactions. Our games map the input context to outcomes by first condensing the…
We provide general theoretical foundations for modeling strategic uncertainty in large distributional Bayesian games with general type spaces, using a version of interim correlated rationalizability. We then focus on the case in which…
Traditionally social sciences are interested in structuring people in multiple groups based on their individual preferences. This pa- per suggests an approach to this problem in the framework of a non- cooperative game theory. Definition of…
Recent price-of-anarchy analyses of games of complete information suggest that coarse correlated equilibria, which characterize outcomes resulting from no-regret learning dynamics, have near-optimal welfare. This work provides two main…
This paper studies Bayesian games with general action spaces, correlated types and interdependent payoffs. We introduce the condition of ``decomposable coarser payoff-relevant information'', and show that this condition is both sufficient…
We study nonzero-sum hypothesis testing games that arise in the context of adversarial classification, in both the Bayesian as well as the Neyman-Pearson frameworks. We first show that these games admit mixed strategy Nash equilibria, and…