Related papers: Simplifying the Kohlberg Criterion on the Nucleolu…
Motivated by the real-world problem of international kidney exchange (IKEP), recent literature introduced a generalized transferable utility matching game featuring a partition of the vertex set of a graph into players, and analyzed its…
Often times, individuals working together as a team can solve hard problems beyond the capability of any individual in the team. Cooperative optimization is a newly proposed general method for attacking hard optimization problems inspired…
Solitude verification is arguably one of the simplest fundamental problems in distributed computing, where the goal is to verify that there is a unique contender in a network. This paper devises a quantum algorithm that exactly solves the…
We consider transferable utility cooperative games with infinitely many players and the core understood in the space of bounded additive set functions. We show that, if a game is bounded below, then its core is non-empty if and only if the…
To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…
We consider dynamic cooperative games, where the worth of coalitions varies over time according to the history of allocations. When defining the core of a dynamic game, we allow the possibility for coalitions to deviate at any time and…
The Stackelberg equilibrium solution concept describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (termed the leader) publicly commits to a strategy and Player 2 (termed the follower) plays a best response to this strategy (ties are broken…
In cooperative game theory, the primary focus is the equitable allocation of payoffs or costs among agents. However, in the practical applications of cooperative games, accurately representing games is challenging. In such cases, using an…
Hedonic games -- at the interface of cooperative game theory and computational social choice -- are coalition formation games in which the players have preferences over the coalitions they can join. Kerkmann et al. [13] introduced…
This paper studies the formation of the grand coalition of a cooperative game by investigating its possible internal dynamics. Each coalition is capable of forcing all players to reconsider the current state of the game when it does not…
Despite the many recent practical and theoretical breakthroughs in computational game theory, equilibrium finding in extensive-form team games remains a significant challenge. While NP-hard in the worst case, there are provably efficient…
Continuous games are multiplayer games in which strategy sets are compact and utility functions are continuous. These games typically have a highly complicated structure of Nash equilibria, and numerical methods for the equilibrium…
We study the notion of efficiency for cooperative games on simplicial complexes. In such games, the grand coalition $[n]$ may be forbidden, and, thus, it is a non-trivial problem to study the total number of payoff $v_{\Delta}$ of a…
Game-theoretic techniques and equilibria analysis facilitate the design and verification of competitive systems. While algorithmic complexity of equilibria computation has been extensively studied, practical implementation and application…
We deal with coalitional games possessing strictly positive values. Individually rational allocations of such a game has clear fractional interpretations. Many concepts, including the long-existing core and other stability notions more…
Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit: Player 1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player 2 (the follower) plays a best response to the leader's…
Cooperative interval games are a generalized model of cooperative games in which the worth of every coalition corresponds to a closed interval representing the possible outcomes of its cooperation. Selections are all possible outcomes of…
Shortlisting of candidates--selecting a group of "best" candidates--is a special case of multiwinner elections. We provide the first in-depth study of the computational complexity of strategic voting for shortlisting based on the perhaps…
We study relationships between different relaxed notions of core stability in hedonic games, which are a class of coalition formation games. Our unified approach applies to a newly introduced family of hedonic games, called $\alpha$-hedonic…
In a one-off Minority game, when a group of players agree to collaborate they gain an advantage over the remaining players. We consider the advantage obtained in a quantum Minority game by a coalition sharing an initially entangled state…