Related papers: Position-Indexed Formulations for Kidney Exchange
A kidney exchange program, also called a kidney paired donation program, can be viewed as a repeated, dynamic trading and allocation mechanism. This suggests that a dynamic algorithm for transplant exchange selection may have superior…
Current kidney exchange pools are of moderate size and thin, as they consist of many highly sensitized patients. Creating a thicker pool can be done by waiting for many pairs to arrive. We analyze a simple class of matching algorithms that…
Motivated by kidney exchange, we study a stochastic cycle and chain packing problem, where we aim to identify structures in a directed graph to maximize the expectation of matched edge weights. All edges are subject to failure, and the…
The kidney exchange problem (KEP) seeks to find possible exchanges among pairs of patients and their incompatible kidney donors while meeting specific optimization criteria such as maximizing the overall number of possible transplants.…
Motivated by kidney exchange, we study the following mechanism-design problem: On a directed graph (of transplant compatibilities among patient-donor pairs), the mechanism must select a simple path (a chain of transplantations) starting at…
This paper presents a comprehensive review of the last two decades of research on Kidney Exchange Programs (KEPs), systematically categorizing and classifying key contributions to provide readers with a structured understanding of…
We study an elementary path problem which appears in the pricing step of a column generation scheme solving the kidney exchange problem. The latter aims at finding exchanges of donations in a pool of patients and donors of kidney…
Kidney paired donation programs (KPDPs) match patients with willing but incompatible donors to compatible donors with an assurance that when they donate, their intended recipient receives a kidney in return from a different donor. A patient…
In Kidney Exchange Programs (KEPs), each participating patient is registered together with an incompatible donor. Donors without an incompatible patient can also register. Then, KEPs typically maximize overall patient benefit through donor…
The kidney paired donation (KPD) program provides an innovative solution to overcome incompatibility challenges in kidney transplants by matching incompatible donor-patient pairs and facilitating kidney exchanges. To address unequal access…
We consider a well-studied online random graph model for kidney exchange, where nodes representing patient-donor pairs arrive over time, and the probability of a directed edge is p. We assume existence of a single altruistic donor, who…
We propose a way in which Kidney exchange can be feasibly, economically and efficiently implemented in Indian medical space, named as Indian Kidney Exchange Program(IKEP) along with Indian specific influence on compatibility and final…
Kidney exchange programs (KEPs) form an innovative approach to increasing the donor pool through allowing the participation of renal patients together with a willing but incompatible donor. The aim of a KEP is to identify groups of…
Balancing fairness and efficiency in resource allocation is a classical economic and computational problem. The price of fairness measures the worst-case loss of economic efficiency when using an inefficient but fair allocation rule; for…
To this day, there are still some countries where the exchange of kidneys between multiple incompatible patient-donor pairs is restricted by law. Typically, legal regulations in this context are put in place to prohibit coercion and…
To overcome incompatibility issues, kidney patients may swap their donors. In international kidney exchange programmes (IKEPs), countries merge their national patient-donor pools. We consider a recently introduced credit system. In each…
The kidney exchange problem (KEP) is to find a constellation of exchanges that maximizes the number of transplants that can be carried out for a set of pairs of patients with kidney disease and their incompatible donors. Recently, this…
Renal patients which have a willing but incompatible donor can decide to participate in a kidney exchange program (KEP). The goal of a KEP is to identify sets of such incompatible pairs that can exchange donors, leading to compatible…
The seminal work of Roth, S\"onmez, & \"Unver shows that the Edmonds-Gallai structure theorem for non-bipartite matching can be leveraged to yield a randomized algorithm to match patient-donor pairs in kidney exchange with extraordinarily…
We design a flexible algorithm that exploits deceased donor kidneys to initiate chains of living donor kidney paired donations, combining deceased and living donor allocation mechanisms to improve the quantity and quality of kidney…