Related papers: Evolutionary consequences of behavioral diversity

Trusting in others and reciprocating that trust with trustworthy actions are crucial to successful and prosperous societies. The Trust Game has been widely used to quantitatively study trust and trustworthiness, involving a sequential…

In a laboratory experiment, round by round, individual interactions should lead to the social evolutionary rotation in population strategy state space. Successive switching the incentive parameter should lead to successive change of the…

Measuring and promoting policy diversity is critical for solving games with strong non-transitive dynamics where strategic cycles exist, and there is no consistent winner (e.g., Rock-Paper-Scissors). With that in mind, maintaining a pool of…

A stylized experiment, the public goods game, has taught us the peculiar reproducible fact that humans tend to contribute more to shared resources than expected from economically rational assumptions. There have been two competing…

We live and cooperate in networks. However, links in networks only allow for pairwise interactions, thus making the framework suitable for dyadic games, but not for games that are played in groups of more than two players. Here, we study…

Population expansions trigger many biomedical and ecological transitions, from tumor growth to invasions of non-native species. Although population spreading often selects for more invasive phenotypes, we show that this outcome is far from…

Whether or not to change strategy depends not only on the personal success of each individual, but also on the success of others. Using this as motivation, we study the evolution of cooperation in games that describe social dilemmas, where…

Strategic diversity is often essential in games: in multi-player games, for example, evaluating a player against a diverse set of strategies will yield a more accurate estimate of its performance. Furthermore, in games with…

The Optional Public Goods Game is a three-strategy game in which an individual can play as a cooperator or defector or decide not to participate. Despite its simplicity, this model can effectively represent many human social dilemmas, such…

Stable mixtures of cooperators and defectors are often seen in nature. This fact is at odds with predictions based on linear public goods games under weak selection. That model implies fixation either of cooperators or of defectors, and the…

Competition among cooperators, defectors, and loners is studied in an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with optional participation. Loners are risk averse i.e. unwilling to participate and rather rely on small but fixed earnings. This…

According to the standard imitation protocol, a less successful player adopts the strategy of the more successful one faithfully for future success. This is the cornerstone of evolutionary game theory that explores the vitality of competing…

In recent years, there has been growing interest in studying evolutionary games with environmental feedback. Previous studies exclusively focus on two-player games. However, extension to multi-player game is needed to study problems such as…

Biodiversity widely observed in ecological systems is attributed to the dynamical balance among the competing species. The time-varying populations of the interacting species are often captured rather well by a set of deterministic…

Zero-determinant strategies are a class of strategies in repeated games which unilaterally control payoffs. Zero-determinant strategies have attracted much attention in studies of social dilemma, particularly in the context of evolution of…

Experimental studies have shown the ubiquity of altruistic behavior in human societies. The social structure is a fundamental ingredient to understand the degree of altruism displayed by the members of a society, in contrast to…

Situations in which immediate self-interest and long-term collective interest conflict often require some form of influence to prevent them from leading to undesirable or unsustainable outcomes. Next to sanctioning, social influence and…

Understanding the evolution of human social systems requires flexible formalisms for the emergence of institutions. Although game theory is normally used to model interactions individually, larger spaces of games can be helpful for modeling…

In social dilemmas, individuals face a conflict between their own self-interest and the collective interest of the group. The provision of reward has been shown to be an effective means to drive cooperation in such situations. However,…

Cyclic dominance has become a pivotal factor in sustaining cooperation within structured populations. However, this comprehension has predominantly revolved around node dynamics, where players are confined to employing the same strategy…