Related papers: Condorcet-Consistent and Approximately Strategypro…
In 2000 Allen Schwenk, using a well-known mathematical model of matchplay tournaments in which the probability of one player beating another in a single match is fixed for each pair of players, showed that the classical single-elimination,…
A social decision rule (SDR) is any non-empty set-valued map that associates any profile of individual preferences with the set of (winning) alternatives. An SDR is Condorcet-consistent if it selects the set of Condorcet winners whenever…
In an election where $n$ voters rank $m$ candidates, a Condorcet winning set is a committee of $k$ candidates such that for any outside candidate, a majority of voters prefer some committee member. Condorcet's paradox shows that some…
In this paper, we study the metric distortion of deterministic social choice rules that choose a winning candidate from a set of candidates based on voter preferences. Voters and candidates are located in an underlying metric space. A voter…
We settle a version of the conjecture about intransitive dice posed by Conrey, Gabbard, Grant, Liu and Morrison in 2016 and Polymath in 2017. We consider generalized dice with $n$ faces and we say that a die $A$ beats $B$ if a random face…
Proponents of Condorcet voting face the question of what to do in the rare case when no Condorcet winner exists. Recent work provides compelling arguments for the rule that should be applied in three-candidate elections, but already with…
One of the central economic paradigms in multi-agent systems is that agents should not be better off by acting dishonestly. In the context of collective decision-making, this axiom is known as strategyproofness and turns out to be rather…
We consider a two-round election model involving $m$ voters and $n$ candidates. Each voter is endowed with a strict preference list ranking the candidates. In the first round, the candidates are partitioned into two subsets, $A$ and $B$,…
We prove that there exists a constant $c > 0$ such that the vertices of every strongly $c \cdot kt$-connected tournament can be partitioned into $t$ parts, each of which induces a strongly $k$-connected tournament. This is clearly tight up…
The Traveling Tournament Problem (TTP) is a hard but interesting sports scheduling problem inspired by Major League Baseball, which is to design a double round-robin schedule such that each pair of teams plays one game in each other's home…
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that no unanimous and non-dictatorial voting rule is strategyproof. We revisit voting rules and consider a weaker notion of strategyproofness called not obvious manipulability that was proposed by…
Tournaments can be used to model a variety of practical scenarios including sports competitions and elections. A natural notion of strength of alternatives in a tournament is a generalized king: an alternative is said to be a $k$-king if it…
Over the last decade, extensive research has been conducted on the algorithmic aspects of designing single-elimination (SE) tournaments. Addressing natural questions of algorithmic tractability, we identify key properties of input instances…
We study matching problems in which agents form one side of a bipartite graph and have preferences over objects on the other side. A central solution concept in this setting is popularity: a matching is popular if it is a (weak) Condorcet…
We find an exact formula for the number of directed 5-cycles in a tournament in terms of its edge score sequence. We use this formula to find both upper and lower bounds on the number of 5-cycles in any $n$-tournament. In particular, we…
A 3-tournament is a complete 3-uniform hypergraph where each edge has a special vertex designated as its tail. A vertex set $X$ dominates $T$ if every vertex not in $X$ is contained in an edge whose tail is in $X$. The domination number of…
We study the problem of scheduling asynchronous round-robin tournaments. We consider three measures of a schedule that concern the quality and fairness of a tournament. We show that the schedule generated by the well-known "circle design"…
This paper considers information sharing in a multi-player repeated game. Every round, each player observes a subset of components of a random vector and then takes a control action. The utility earned by each player depends on the full…
By classic results in social choice theory, any reasonable preferential voting method sometimes gives individuals an incentive to report an insincere preference. The extent to which different voting methods are more or less resistant to…
This paper introduces the Voting with Random Proposers (VRP) procedure to address the challenges of agenda manipulation in voting. In each round of VRP, a randomly selected proposer suggests an alternative that is voted on against the…