Related papers: Network Resource Sharing Games with Instantaneous …

Multiplayer games with selfish agents naturally occur in the design of distributed and embedded systems. As the goals of selfish agents are usually neither equivalent nor antagonistic to each other, such games are non zero-sum games. We…

In this paper, we study the problem of consensus-based distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking where a network of players, abstracted as a directed graph, aim to minimize their own local cost functions non-cooperatively. Considering the…

We consider a model of priced resource sharing that combines both queueing behavior and strategic behavior. We study a priority service model where a single server allocates its capacity to agents in proportion to their payment to the…

We study a problem of trust in a distributed system in which a common resource is shared by multiple parties. In such naturally information-limited settings, parties abide by a behavioral protocol that leads to fair sharing of the resource.…

A game-theoretic model is proposed to study the cross-layer problem of joint power and rate control with quality of service (QoS) constraints in multiple-access networks. In the proposed game, each user seeks to choose its transmit power…

One of the contributions of this work is to formulate the problem of energy-efficient power control in multiple access channels (namely, channels which comprise several transmitters and one receiver) as a stochastic differential game. The…

In this paper, we consider the competitive diffusion game, and study the existence of its pure-strategy Nash equilibrium when defined over general undirected networks. We first determine the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria for two…

The use of game theoretic methods for control in multiagent systems has been an important topic in recent research. Valid utility games in particular have been used to model real-world problems; such games have the convenient property that…

This paper presents a general closed graph property for (randomized strategy) Nash equilibrium correspondence in large games. In particular, we show that for any large game with a convergent sequence of fiinite-player games, the limit of…

We consider selfish sources that send updates to a monitor over a shared wireless access. The sources would like to minimize the age of their information at the monitor. Our goal is to devise strategies that incentivize such sources to use…

Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking of aggregative games is investigated and a continuous-time algorithm is proposed. The algorithm is designed by virtue of projected gradient play dynamics and distributed average tracking dynamics, and is…

We present a fully-distributed algorithm for Nash equilibrium seeking in aggregative games over networks. The proposed scheme endows each agent with a gradient-based scheme equipped with a tracking mechanism to locally reconstruct the…

In this paper, the problem of finding a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) of a networked game is studied. Players are only able to choose their decisions from a feasible action set. The feasible set is considered to be a private linear…

In cost sharing games, the existence and efficiency of pure Nash equilibria fundamentally depends on the method that is used to share the resources' costs. We consider a general class of resource allocation problems in which a set of…

We consider a two-player network inspection game, in which a defender allocates sensors with potentially heterogeneous detection capabilities in order to detect multiple attacks caused by a strategic attacker. The objective of the defender…

In this paper we consider the problem of distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking over networks, a setting in which players have limited local information. We start from a continuous-time gradient-play dynamics that converges to an NE…

The problem of efficient sharing of a resource is nearly ubiquitous. Except for pure public goods, each agent's use creates a negative externality; often the negative externality is so strong that efficient sharing is impossible in the…

This paper considers the competitive resource allocation problem in Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO) interfering channels, when users maximize their energy efficiency. Considering each transmitter-receiver pair as a selfish player,…

With the advent of prosumers, the traditional centralized operation may become impracticable due to computational burden, privacy concerns, and conflicting interests. In this paper, an energy sharing mechanism is proposed to accommodate…

We consider a one-sided assignment market or exchange network with transferable utility and propose a model for the dynamics of bargaining in such a market. Our dynamical model is local, involving iterative updates of 'offers' based on…