Related papers: Maximum-expectation matching under recourse
Consider a matching problem on a graph where disjoint sets of vertices are privately owned by self-interested agents. An edge between a pair of vertices indicates compatibility and allows the vertices to match. We seek a mechanism to…
Relatives and friends of an end-stage renal disease patient who offer to donate a kidney are often found to be incompatible with their intended recipients. Kidney paired donation matches one patient and his incompatible donor with another…
Kidney paired donation programs (KPDPs) match patients with willing but incompatible donors to compatible donors with an assurance that when they donate, their intended recipient receives a kidney in return from a different donor. A patient…
Motivated by kidney exchange, we study a stochastic cycle and chain packing problem, where we aim to identify structures in a directed graph to maximize the expectation of matched edge weights. All edges are subject to failure, and the…
In kidney exchange programs, multiple patient-donor pairs each of whom are otherwise incompatible, exchange their donors to receive compatible kidneys. The Kidney Exchange problem is typically modelled as a directed graph where every vertex…
In the query-commit problem we are given a graph where edges have distinct probabilities of existing. It is possible to query the edges of the graph, and if the queried edge exists then its endpoints are irrevocably matched. The goal is to…
We revisit the problem of designing optimal, individually rational matching mechanisms (in a general sense, allowing for cycles in directed graphs), where each player --- who is associated with a subset of vertices --- matches as many of…
In barter exchanges, participants swap goods with one another without exchanging money; exchanges are often facilitated by a central clearinghouse, with the goal of maximizing the aggregate quality (or number) of swaps. Barter exchanges are…
Algorithms for exchange of kidneys is one of the key successful applications in market design, artificial intelligence, and operations research. Potent immunosuppressant drugs suppress the body's ability to reject a transplanted organ up to…
Kidney exchanges are organized markets where patients swap willing but incompatible donors. In the last decade, kidney exchanges grew from small and regional to large and national---and soon, international. This growth results in more lives…
In this paper, we generalize the recently studied Stochastic Matching problem to more accurately model a significant medical process, kidney exchange, and several other applications. Up until now the Stochastic Matching problem that has…
Matching algorithms are used routinely to match donors to recipients for solid organs transplantation, for the assignment of medical residents to hospitals, record linkage in databases, scheduling jobs on machines, network switching, online…
In kidney exchange programmes (KEP) patients may swap their incompatible donors leading to cycles of kidney transplants. Nowadays, countries try to merge their national patient-donor pools leading to international KEPs (IKEPs). As shown in…
The stochastic matching problem deals with finding a maximum matching in a graph whose edges are unknown but can be accessed via queries. This is a special case of stochastic $k$-set packing, where the problem is to find a maximum packing…
Given a pair of graphs with the same number of vertices, the inexact graph matching problem consists in finding a correspondence between the vertices of these graphs that minimizes the total number of induced edge disagreements. We study…
Maximum bipartite matching is a fundamental algorithmic problem which can be solved in polynomial time. We consider a natural variant in which there is a separation constraint: the vertices on one side lie on a path or a grid, and two…
Motivated by kidney exchange, we study the following mechanism-design problem: On a directed graph (of transplant compatibilities among patient-donor pairs), the mechanism must select a simple path (a chain of transplantations) starting at…
In barter exchanges, participants directly trade their endowed goods in a constrained economic setting without money. Transactions in barter exchanges are often facilitated via a central clearinghouse that must match participants even in…
Kidney exchange programs (KEP's) represent an additional possibility of transplant for patients suffering from end stage kidney disease. If a patient has a willing living donor with whom the patient is not compatible, the pair…
We study the problem of matching agents who arrive at a marketplace over time and leave after d time periods. Agents can only be matched while they are present in the marketplace. Each pair of agents can yield a different match value, and…