Related papers: Evaluating Power System Vulnerability to False Dat…
This paper concerns the security of the electric power transmission grid facing the threat of malicious cyber-physical attackers. We posit that there is no such thing as perfectly effective cyber-security. Rather, any cyber-security measure…
As one of the largest and most complex systems on earth, power grid (PG) operation and control have stepped forward as a compound analysis on both physical and cyber layers which makes it vulnerable to assaults from economic and security…
Measures of power grid vulnerability are often assessed by the amount of damage an adversary can exact on the network. However, the cascading impact of such attacks is often overlooked, even though cascades are one of the primary causes of…
Applications of cyber technologies improve the quality of monitoring and decision making in smart grid. These cyber technologies are vulnerable to malicious attacks, and compromising them can have serious technical and economical problems.…
We investigate load redistribution (LR) attacks on integrated electricity-gas systems (IEGSs) and proposes a bilevel mixed-integer model to identify the most severe LR attack from an economic perspective. Under a mild assumption, we prove…
Given that disturbances to the stable and normal operation of power systems have grown phenomenally, particularly in terms of unauthorized access to confidential and critical data, injection of malicious software, and exploitation of…
Modern power systems face growing risks from cyber-physical attacks, necessitating enhanced resilience due to their societal function as critical infrastructures. The challenge is that defense of large-scale systems-of-systems requires…
Small-Signal Stability (SSS) is crucial for the control of power grids. However, False Data Injection (FDI) attacks against SSS can impact the grid stability, hence, the security of SSS needs to be studied. This paper proposes a formal…
Effective defense against cyber-physical attacks in power grid requires the capability of accurate damage assessment within the attacked area. While some solutions have been proposed to recover the phase angles and the link status (i.e.,…
This paper firstly addresses the problem of risk assessment under false data injection attacks on uncertain control systems. We consider an adversary with complete system knowledge, injecting stealthy false data into an uncertain control…
Security is one of the biggest concern in power system operation. Recently, the emerging cyber security threats to operational functions of power systems arouse high public attention, and cybersecurity vulnerability thus become an emerging…
The wide adoption of Internet of Things (IoT)-enabled energy devices improves the quality of life, but simultaneously, it enlarges the attack surface of the power grid system. The adversary can gain illegitimate control of a large number of…
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are increasingly complex and frequently integrated into modern societies via critical infrastructure systems, products, and services. Consequently, there is a need for reliable functionality of these complex…
Malicious attacks in the power system can eventually result in a large-scale cascade failure if not attended on time. These attacks, which are traditionally classified into \emph{physical} and \emph{cyber attacks}, can be avoided by using…
Once critical substations are compromised, attack agents can coordinate among their peers to plot for maximizing disruption using local control devices. For defenders, it is critical to enumerate and identify all digital relays to determine…
In this paper we develop a set of algorithms that can detect the identities of malicious data-manipulators in distributed optimization loops for estimating oscillation modes in large power system models. The estimation is posed in terms of…
This paper studies the physical consequences of a class of unobservable state-and-topology cyber-physical attacks in which both state and topology data for a sub-network of the network are changed by an attacker to mask a physical attack.…
We address the problem of constructing false data injection (FDI) attacks that can bypass the bad data detector (BDD) of a power grid. The attacker is assumed to have access to only power flow measurement data traces (collected over a…
An approach is proposed to identify optimal asset protection strategies based on vulnerability assessment outcomes. Traditional bilevel attacker-defender models emphasize worst-case scenarios but offer limited defensive guidance. In…
The dynamic performance of the generators is a critical factor for the safe operation of the power grid. To this extent, the stability of the frequency of generators is the target of cyber attacks since its instability may lead to sizable…