Related papers: Secretary Problem with quality-based payoff

We study a variant of the single-choice prophet inequality problem where the decision-maker does not know the underlying distribution and has only access to a set of samples from the distributions. Rubinstein et al. [2020] showed that the…

We study buyer-optimal procurement mechanisms when quality is contractible. When some costs are borne by every participant of a procurement auction regardless of winning, the classic analysis should be amended. We show that an optimal…

This paper discusses the odds problem, proposed by Bruss in 2000, and its variants. A recurrence relation called a dynamic programming (DP) equation is used to find an optimal stopping policy of the odds problem and its variants. In 2013,…

In this paper we extend the principle of proportional representation to rankings. We consider the setting where alternatives need to be ranked based on approval preferences. In this setting, proportional representation requires that…

I introduce a model of predictive scoring. A receiver wants to predict a sender's quality. An intermediary observes multiple features of the sender and aggregates them into a score. Based on the score, the receiver makes a decision. The…

We consider the problem of electing a committee of $k$ candidates, subject to some constraints as to what this committee is supposed to look like. In our framework, the candidates are given labels as an abstraction of a politician's…

Winners-take-all situations introduce an incentive for agents to diversify their behavior, since doing so will result in splitting an eventual price with fewer people. At the same time, when the payoff of a process depends on a parameter…

In the prophet secretary problem, $n$ values are drawn independently from known distributions, and presented in a uniformly random order. A decision-maker must accept or reject each value when it is presented, and may accept at most $k$…

Classical voting rules assume that ballots are complete preference orders over candidates. However, when the number of candidates is large enough, it is too costly to ask the voters to rank all candidates. We suggest to fix a rank k, to ask…

We consider the classical online scheduling problem P||C_{max} in which jobs are released over list and provide a nearly optimal online algorithm. More precisely, an online algorithm whose competitive ratio is at most (1+\epsilon) times…

Various voting rules are based on ranking the candidates by scores induced by aggregating voter preferences. A winner (respectively, unique winner) is a candidate who receives a score not smaller than (respectively, strictly greater than)…

A fundamental decision faced by a firm hiring employees - and a familiar one to anyone who has dealt with the academic job market, for example - is deciding what caliber of candidates to pursue. Should the firm try to increase its…

The Stable Roommates problem involves matching a set of agents into pairs based on the agents' strict ordinal preference lists. The matching must be stable, meaning that no two agents strictly prefer each other to their assigned partners. A…

Motivated by online settings where users can provide explicit feedback about the relevance of products that are sequentially presented to them, we look at the recommendation process as a problem of dynamically optimizing this relevance…

We study the selection of agents based on mutual nominations, a theoretical problem with many applications from committee selection to AI alignment. As agents both select and are selected, they may be incentivized to misrepresent their true…

We introduce a method based on the Public Goods Game for solving optimization tasks. In particular, we focus on the Traveling Salesman Problem, i.e. a NP-hard problem whose search space exponentially grows increasing the number of cities.…

In this paper, we analyze the problem of how to adapt the concept of proportionality to situations where several perfectly divisible resources have to be allocated among certain set of agents that have exactly one claim which is used for…

A variant of the classical knapsack problem is considered in which each item is associated with an integer weight and a qualitative level. We define a dominance relation over the feasible subsets of the given item set and show that this…

In the Shift Bribery problem, we are given an election (based on preference orders), a preferred candidate $p$, and a budget. The goal is to ensure that $p$ wins by shifting $p$ higher in some voters' preference orders. However, each such…

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires \emph{multiple} agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a…