Related papers: Fixation probabilities for any configuration of tw…
Whether or not cooperation is favored in evolutionary games on graphs depends on the population structure and spatial properties of the interaction network. Population structures can be expressed as configurations. Such configurations…
We study the emergence of cooperation in structured populations with any arrangement of cooperators and defectors on the evolutionary graph. Using structure coefficients defined for configurations describing such arrangements of any number…
The spatial structure of populations may promote the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. Cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma is favored under specific update rules in evolutionary graph theory models with one individual per node of…
The spatial structure of an evolving population affects which mutations become fixed. Some structures amplify selection, increasing the likelihood that beneficial mutations become fixed while deleterious mutations do not. Other structures…
Evolution occurs in populations of reproducing individuals. The structure of a biological population affects which traits evolve. Understanding evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations is difficult. Precise results have been…
In evolutionary dynamics, a key measure of a mutant trait's success is the probability that it takes over the population given some initial mutant-appearance distribution. This "fixation probability" is difficult to compute in general, as…
We study the combined influence of selection and random fluctuations on the evolutionary dynamics of two-strategy ("cooperation" and "defection") games in populations comprising cooperation facilitators. The latter are individuals that…
Evolutionary graph theory (EGT) studies the effect of population structure on evolutionary dynamics. The vertices of the graph represent the $N$ individuals. The edges denote interactions for competitive replacement. Two standard update…
We analyze evolutionary dynamics on graphs, where the nodes represent individuals of a population. The links of a node describe which other individuals can be displaced by the offspring of the individual on that node. Amplifiers of…
The emergence and maintenance of cooperative behavior is a fascinating topic in evolutionary biology and social science. The public goods game (PGG) is a paradigm for exploring cooperative behavior. In PGG, the total resulting payoff is…
Evolutionary graph theory is a well established framework for modelling the evolution of social behaviours in structured populations. An emerging consensus in this field is that graphs that exhibit heterogeneity in the number of connections…
According to the evolutionary death-birth protocol, a player is chosen randomly to die and neighbors compete for the available position proportional to their fitness. Hence, the status of the focal player is completely ignored and has no…
Hypergraphs have been a useful tool for analyzing population dynamics such as opinion formation and the public goods game occurring in overlapping groups of individuals. In the present study, we propose and analyze evolutionary dynamics on…
In this Letter, we study how cooperation is organized in complex topologies by analyzing the evolutionary (replicator) dynamics of the Prisoner's Dilemma, a two-players game with two available strategies, defection and cooperation, whose…
Cooperation is a difficult proposition in the face of Darwinian selection. Those that defect have an evolutionary advantage over cooperators who should therefore die out. However, spatial structure enables cooperators to survive through the…
Natural microbial populations often have complex spatial structures. This can impact their evolution, in particular the ability of mutants to take over. While mutant fixation probabilities are known to be unaffected by sufficiently…
We study two of the simple rules on finite graphs under the death-birth updating and the imitation updating discovered by Ohtsuki, Hauert, Lieberman and Nowak [Nature 441 (2006) 502-505]. Each rule specifies a payoff-ratio cutoff point for…
Understanding how cooperation can evolve in populations despite its cost to individual cooperators is an important challenge. Models of spatially structured populations with one individual per node of a graph have shown that cooperation,…
Evolutionary models are used to study the self-organisation of collective action, often incorporating population structure due to its ubiquitous presence and long-known impact on emerging phenomena. We investigate the evolution of…
Spatial structure is one of the simplest and most studied ecological factors that affect the evolution of cooperation. It has been shown that spatial reciprocity promotes cooperation due to the formation of cooperative clusters, which…