Related papers: Existence of equilibrium for generalized games in …

A notion of incentive for agents is introduced which leads to a very general notion of an equilibrium for a finite game. Sufficient conditions for the existence of these equilibria are given. Known existence theorems are shown to be…

In this paper, we prove the existence of the equilibrium in choice for games in choice form. These games have recently been introduced by A. Stefanescu, M. Ferrara and M. V. Stefanescu. Our results link the recent research to the older…

In this paper, we introduce an abstract fuzzy economy (generalized fuzzy game) model with a countable space of actions and we study the existence of the fuzzy equilibrium. As applications, two types of results are obtained. The first ones…

We study generalized games defined over Banach spaces using variational analysis. To reformulate generalized games as quasi-variational inequality problems, we will first form a suitable principal operator and study some significant…

The purpose of this paper is to prove the existence of solutions of quasi-equilibrium problems without any generalized monotonicity assumption. Additionally, we give an application to quasi-optimization problems.

In this paper, we firstly prove the existence of the equilibrium for the generalized abstract economy. We apply these results to show the existence of solutions for systems of vector quasi-equilibrium problems with multivalued trifunctions.…

We introduce a simple extensive-form algorithm for finding equilibria of two-player, zero-sum games. The algorithm is realization equivalent to a generalized form of Fictitious Play. We compare its performance to that of a similar…

Correlated equilibria -- and their generalization $\Phi$-equilibria -- are a fundamental object of study in game theory, offering a more tractable alternative to Nash equilibria in multi-player settings. While computational aspects of…

We introduce the class of pay or play games, which captures scenarios in which each decision maker is faced with a choice between two actions: one with a fixed payoff and an- other with a payoff dependent on others' selected actions. This…

Nash equilibrium is one of the most influential solution concepts in game theory. With the development of computer science and artificial intelligence, there is an increasing demand on Nash equilibrium computation, especially for Internet…

Although mixed extensions of finite games always admit equilibria, this is not the case for countable games, the best-known example being Wald's pick-the-larger-integer game. Several authors have provided conditions for the existence of…

We introduce the notions of w-lower semicontinuous and almost w-lower semicontinuous correspondence with respect to a given set and prove a new fixed-point theorem. We also introduce the notion of correspondence with e-LSCS-property. As…

In Stackelberg v/s Stackelberg games a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium problems are plagued by the nonuniqueness of…

This paper establishes the existence of equilibria result of a class of mean field games with singular controls. The interaction takes place through both states and controls. A relaxed solution approach is used. To circumvent the tightness…

This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept "robust perfect equilibrium" for non-cooperative games with a continuum of players, incorporating three types of perturbations. Such an equilibrium is shown to exist (in symmetric mixed…

We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates both incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting point is players' preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially…

In this paper we define the canonical mixed extension of a decision form game. We motivate the necessity to introduce this concept and we show several examples about the new concept. In particular we focus our study upon the mixed…

Economists were content with the concept of the Nash equilibrium as game theory's solution concept until Daskalakis, Goldberg, and Papadimitriou showed that finding a Nash equilibrium is most likely a computationally hard problem, a result…

We introduce the notions of weakly *-concave and weakly naturally quasi-concave correspondence and prove fixed point theorems and continuous selection theorems for these kind of correspondences. As applications in the game theory, by using…

We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…