Related papers: Testing the Quantal Response Hypothesis
We present a quantum approach to a signaling game; a special kind of extensive games of incomplete information. Our model is based on quantum schemes for games in strategic form where players perform unitary operators on their own qubits of…
Nash equilibrium (NE) assumes that players always make a best response. However, this is not always true; sometimes people cooperate even it is not a best response to do so. For example, in the Prisoner's Dilemma, people often cooperate.…
The literature on dynamic discrete games often assumes that the conditional choice probabilities and the state transition probabilities are homogeneous across markets and over time. We refer to this as the "homogeneity assumption" in…
We study the global convergence of policy optimization for finding the Nash equilibria (NE) in zero-sum linear quadratic (LQ) games. To this end, we first investigate the landscape of LQ games, viewing it as a nonconvex-nonconcave…
This paper studies a class of strongly monotone games involving non-cooperative agents that optimize their own time-varying cost functions. We assume that the agents can observe other agents' historical actions and choose actions that best…
We consider game theory from the perspective of quantum algorithms. Strategies in classical game theory are either pure (deterministic) or mixed (probabilistic). We introduce these basic ideas in the context of a simple example, closely…
The non-extensibility of quantum theory into a theory with improved predictive power is based on a strong assumption of independent free choice, in which the physicists pick a measurement axis independently of anything that couldn't have…
A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to…
Optimizing strategic decisions (a.k.a. computing equilibrium) is key to the success of many non-cooperative multi-agent applications. However, in many real-world situations, we may face the exact opposite of this game-theoretic problem --…
We introduce a set-valued solution concept, M equilibrium, to capture empirical regularities from over half a century of game-theory experiments. We show M equilibrium serves as a meta theory for various models that hitherto were considered…
We study nonzero-sum hypothesis testing games that arise in the context of adversarial classification, in both the Bayesian as well as the Neyman-Pearson frameworks. We first show that these games admit mixed strategy Nash equilibria, and…
In this paper, we study a class of linear-quadratic (LQ) mean field games of controls with common noises and their corresponding $N$-player games. The theory of mean field game of controls considers a class of mean field games where the…
We will discuss the generalization of entropic uncertainty principles in terms of a game. The game involves k-players, each measuring one of k possible observables. The question is, what is the maximum number of players that can play such…
We present a new framework for creating a quantum version of a classical game, based on Fine's theorem. This theorem shows that for a given set of marginals, a system of Bell's inequalities constitutes both necessary and sufficient…
We study strategic interaction in data-driven games where players face uncertainty about payoff distributions inferred from finite samples. To model calibrated attitudes toward such uncertainty, we formulate distributionally robust games…
The well known refinement of the Nash Equilibrium (NE) called an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) is investigated in the quantum Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game that is played using an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen type setting. Earlier results…
As all physical adaptive quantum-enhanced metrology schemes operate under noisy conditions with only partially understood noise characteristics, so a practical control policy must be robust even for unknown noise. We aim to devise a test to…
We report constructing quantum games directly from a system of Bell's inequalities using Arthur Fine's analysis published in early 1980s. This analysis showed that such a system of inequalities forms a set of both necessary and sufficient…
We study the problem of characterizing the set of games that are consistent with observed equilibrium play. Our contribution is to develop and analyze a new methodology based on convex optimization to address this problem for many classes…
We consider payoff-based learning of a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in multi-agent systems. Our focus is on games with jointly convex constraints of a linear structure and strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. We present a convergent…