Related papers: Compositional security and collateral leakage
We present a simplified framework for proving sequential composability in the quantum setting. In particular, we give a new, simulation-based, definition for security in the bounded-quantum-storage model, and show that this definition…
This paper investigates a flow- and path-sensitive static information flow analysis. Compared with security type systems with fixed labels, it has been shown that flow-sensitive type systems accept more secure programs. We show that an…
Benefiting from cloud computing, today's early-stage quantum computers can be remotely accessed via the cloud services, known as Quantum-as-a-Service (QaaS). However, it poses a high risk of data leakage in quantum machine learning (QML).…
We present a deductive approach for the analysis of secure information flows with support for fine-grained policies that include declassifications in the form of delimited information release. By explicitly tracking the dependencies of…
We define cheat sensitive cryptographic protocols between mistrustful parties as protocols which guarantee that, if either cheats, the other has some nonzero probability of detecting the cheating. We give an example of an unconditionally…
Traditional approaches to Quantitative Information Flow (QIF) represent the adversary's prior knowledge of possible secret values as a single probability distribution. This representation may miss important structure. For instance,…
Environmental noise (e.g.heat, ionized particles, etc.) causes transient faults in hardware, which lead to corruption of stored values. Mission-critical devices require such faults to be mitigated by fault-tolerance --- a combination of…
It is common to prove by reasoning over source code that programs do not leak sensitive data. But doing so leaves a gap between reasoning and reality that can only be filled by accounting for the behaviour of the compiler. This task is…
We study quantum protocols among two distrustful parties. By adopting a rather strict definition of correctness - guaranteeing that honest players obtain their correct outcomes only - we can show that every strictly correct quantum protocol…
As quantum key distribution becomes a mature technology, it appears clearly that some assumptions made in the security proofs cannot be justified in practical implementations. This might open the door to possible side-channel attacks. We…
In quantum cryptography, the level of security attainable by a protocol which implements a particular task $N$ times bears no simple relation to the level of security attainable by a protocol implementing the task once. Useful partial…
Protecting source code against reverse engineering and theft is an important problem. The goal is to carry out computations using confidential algorithms on an untrusted party while ensuring confidentiality of algorithms. This problem has…
Most security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) assume that there is no unwanted information leakage about the state preparation process. However, this assumption is impossible to guarantee in practice, as QKD systems can leak…
As we are entering the era of constructing practical quantum computers, suppressing the inevitable noise to accomplish reliable computational tasks will be the primary goal. Leakage noise, as the amplitude population leaking outside the…
The advantages of quantum information processing are in many cases obtained as consequences of quantum interactions, especially for computational tasks where two-qubit interactions are essential. In this work, we establish the framework of…
Consider a system, including a user, $N$ servers, and $K$ basic functions which are known at all of the servers. Using the combination of those basic functions, it is possible to construct a wide class of functions. The user wishes to…
Leakage of data from publicly available Machine Learning (ML) models is an area of growing significance as commercial and government applications of ML can draw on multiple sources of data, potentially including users' and clients'…
Compositional synthesis relies on the discovery of assumptions, i.e., restrictions on the behavior of the remainder of the system that allow a component to realize its specification. In order to avoid losing valid solutions, these…
We consider the problem of specifying and proving the security of non-trivial, concurrent programs that intentionally leak information. We present a method that decomposes the problem into (a) proving that the program only leaks information…
We consider a calculus for multiparty sessions enriched with security levels for messages. We propose a monitored semantics for this calculus, which blocks the execution of processes as soon as they attempt to leak information. We…