Related papers: Online Truthful Mechanisms for Multi-sided Markets
We consider the problem of designing auctions which maximize consumer surplus (i.e., the social welfare minus the payments charged to the buyers). In the consumer surplus maximization problem, a seller with a set of goods faces a set of…
We consider a model of bilateral trade with private values. The value of the buyer and the cost of the seller are jointly distributed. The true joint distribution is unknown to the designer, however, the marginal distributions of the value…
We study mechanism design when agents may have hidden secondary goals which will manifest as non-trivial preferences among outcomes for which their primary utility is the same. We show that in such cases, a mechanism is robust against…
In this paper, we consider the problem of resource congestion control for competing online learning agents. On the basis of non-cooperative game as the model for the interaction between the agents, and the noisy online mirror ascent as the…
We revisit the well-studied problem of designing mechanisms for one-sided matching markets, where a set of $n$ agents needs to be matched to a set of $n$ heterogeneous items. Each agent $i$ has a value $v_{i,j}$ for each item $j$, and these…
A recent line of research has established a novel desideratum for designing approximately-revenue-optimal multi-item mechanisms, namely the buy-many constraint. Under this constraint, prices for different allocations made by the mechanism…
In a crowdsourcing market, a requester is looking to form a team of workers to perform a complex task that requires a variety of skills. Candidate workers advertise their certified skills and bid prices for their participation. We design…
We study the problem of designing revenue-maximizing mechanisms for a selfish mediator who facilitates trade between a buyer and a seller. We consider a setting where the mediator does not have information advantage and the buyer's…
We study a basic auction design problem with online supply. There are two unit-demand bidders and two types of items. The first item type will arrive first for sure, and the second item type may or may not arrive. The auctioneer has to…
The society's insatiable appetites for personal data are driving the emergency of data markets, allowing data consumers to launch customized queries over the datasets collected by a data broker from data owners. In this paper, we study how…
We advance a recently flourishing line of work at the intersection of learning theory and computational economics by studying the learnability of two classes of mechanisms prominent in economics, namely menus of lotteries and two-part…
We revisit the classic problem of fair division from a mechanism design perspective, using {\em Proportional Fairness} as a benchmark. In particular, we aim to allocate a collection of divisible items to a set of agents while incentivizing…
We consider a trading marketplace that is populated by traders with diverse trading strategies and objectives. The marketplace allows the suppliers to list their goods and facilitates matching between buyers and sellers. In return, such a…
Two-sided matching markets have long existed to pair agents in the absence of regulated exchanges. A common example is school choice, where a matching mechanism uses student and school preferences to assign students to schools. In such…
Computing market equilibria is a problem of both theoretical and applied interest. Much research to date focuses on the case of static Fisher markets with full information on buyers' utility functions and item supplies. Motivated by…
We study how to maximize the broker's (expected) profit in a two-sided market, where she buys items from a set of sellers and resells them to a set of buyers. Each seller has a single item to sell and holds a private value on her item, and…
We study resource allocation in two-sided markets from a fundamental perspective and introduce a general modeling and algorithmic framework to effectively incorporate the complex and multidimensional aspects of fairness. Our main technical…
Mechanisms such as auctions and pricing schemes are utilized to design strategic (noncooperative) games for networked systems. Although the participating players are selfish, these mechanisms ensure that the game outcome is optimal with…
In many shopping scenarios, e.g., in online shopping, customers have a large menu of options to choose from. However, most of the buyers do not browse all the options and make decision after considering only a small part of the menu. To…
We study the problem of designing a two-sided market (double auction) to maximize the gains from trade (social welfare) under the constraints of (dominant-strategy) incentive compatibility and budget-balance. Our goal is to do so for an…