Related papers: Local Optimality of Almost Piecewise-Linear Quanti…
We propose a numerical algorithm for computing approximately optimal solutions of the matching for teams problem. Our algorithm is efficient for problems involving large number of agent categories and allows for non-discrete agent type…
In a recent work on quantum state preparation, S{\o}rensen and colleagues explore the possibility of using video games to help design quantum control protocols. The authors present a game called "Quantum Moves" in which gamers have to move…
Energy systems are changing rapidly. More and more, energy production is becoming decentralized, highly variable and intermittent (solar, wind), while demand is diversifying (electric vehicles). As a result, balancing supply and demand is…
We study a Stackelberg variant of the classical discrete-time Dynkin game, in which Player 1 (the leader) commits to a stopping strategy first and Player 2 (the follower) responds optimally. This leader-follower structure induces an optimal…
In this paper, we carry out the numerical analysis of a nonsmooth quasilinear elliptic optimal control problem, where the coefficient in the divergence term of the corresponding state equation is not differentiable with respect to the state…
In this research, we investigate a general shape optimization problem in which the state equation is expressed using a nonlocal and nonlinear operator. We prove the existence of a minimum point for a functional $F$ defined on the family of…
We study the problem of online learning in Stackelberg games with side information between a leader and a sequence of followers. In every round the leader observes contextual information and commits to a mixed strategy, after which the…
We consider a mean-field control problem in which admissible controls are required to be adapted to the common noise filtration. The main objective is to show how the mean-field control problem can be approximates by time consistent…
Covering and packing problems can be modeled as games to encapsulate interesting social and engineering settings. These games have a high Price of Anarchy in their natural formulation. However, existing research applicable to specific…
Meirowitz [17] showed existence of continuous behavioural function equilibria for Bayesian games with non-finite type and action spaces. A key condition for the proof of the existence result is equi-continuity of behavioural functions…
We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information…
Building upon the results in [Hinterm\"uller et al., SIAM J. Optim, '15], generalized Nash equilibrium problems are considered, in which the feasible set of each player is influenced by the decisions of their competitors. This is realized…
In this paper, $2\times2$ zero-sum games are studied under the following assumptions: $(1)$ One of the players (the leader) commits to choose its actions by sampling a given probability measure (strategy); $(2)$ The leader announces its…
We consider two-player partial-observation stochastic games on finite-state graphs where player 1 has partial observation and player 2 has perfect observation. The winning condition we study are \omega-regular conditions specified as parity…
We study the value and the optimal strategies for a two-player zero-sum optimal stopping game with incomplete and asymmetric information. In our Bayesian set-up, the drift of the underlying diffusion process is unknown to one player…
Resource competition problems are often modeled using Colonel Blotto games, where players take simultaneous actions. However, many real-world scenarios involve sequential decision-making rather than simultaneous moves. To model these…
This work is concerned with an optimal control problem governed by a non-smooth quasilinear elliptic equation with a nonlinear coefficient in the principal part that is locally Lipschitz continuous and directionally but not G\^ateaux…
We propose and analyze reliable and efficient a posteriori error estimators for an optimal control problem that involves a nondifferentiable cost functional, the Poisson problem as state equation and control constraints. To approximate the…
We consider a bilevel continuous knapsack problem where the leader controls the capacity of the knapsack, while the follower chooses a feasible packing maximizing his own profit. The leader's aim is to optimize a linear objective function…
The Stackelberg equilibrium solution concept describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (termed the leader) publicly commits to a strategy and Player 2 (termed the follower) plays a best response to this strategy (ties are broken…