Related papers: Local Optimality of Almost Piecewise-Linear Quanti…
Partially observable stochastic games provide a rich mathematical paradigm for modeling multi-agent dynamic decision making under uncertainty and partial information. However, they generally do not admit closed-form solutions and are…
We consider a discrete version of the Witsenhausen problem where all random variables are bounded and take on integer values. Our main goal is to understand the complexity of computing good strategies given the distributions for the initial…
This paper is concerned with a linear-quadratic (LQ) leader-follower differential game with mixed deterministic and stochastic controls. In the game, the follower is a random controller which means that the follower can choose adapted…
In this paper, we consider finite model approximations of a large class of static and dynamic team problems where these models are constructed through uniform quantization of the observation and action spaces of the agents. The strategies…
This paper is concerned with a Stackelberg stochastic differential game with asymmetric noisy observation, with one follower and one leader. In our model, the follower cannot observe the state process directly, but could observe a noisy…
This paper is concerned with a linear-quadratic partially observed Stackelberg stochastic differential game with correlated state and observation noises, where the diffusion coefficient does not contain the control variable and the control…
In Stackelberg v/s Stackelberg games a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium problems are plagued by the nonuniqueness of…
Information uncertainty is one of the major challenges facing applications of game theory. In the context of Stackelberg games, various approaches have been proposed to deal with the leader's incomplete knowledge about the follower's…
The concept of leader--follower (or Stackelberg) equilibrium plays a central role in a number of real--world applications of game theory. While the case with a single follower has been thoroughly investigated, results with multiple…
Recent results in the ML community have revealed that learning algorithms used to compute the optimal strategy for the leader to commit to in a Stackelberg game, are susceptible to manipulation by the follower. Such a learning algorithm…
This paper studies an instance of zero-sum games in which one player (the leader) commits to its opponent (the follower) to choose its actions by sampling a given probability measure (strategy). The actions of the leader are observed by the…
This paper is concerned with a Stackelberg game of backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs) with partial information, where the information of the follower is a sub-$\sigma$-algebra of that of the leader. Necessary and sufficient…
This paper is concerned with a two-person zero-sum indefinite stochastic linear-quadratic Stackelberg differential game with asymmetric informational uncertainties, where both the leader and follower face different and unknown disturbances.…
In a multi-follower Bayesian Stackelberg game, a leader plays a mixed strategy over $L$ actions to which $n\ge 1$ followers, each having one of $K$ possible private types, best respond. The leader's optimal strategy depends on the…
We study a two-player Stackelberg game with incomplete information such that the follower's strategy belongs to a known family of parameterized functions with an unknown parameter vector. We design an adaptive learning approach to…
We consider a quasi-variational inequality governed by a moving set. We employ the assumption that the movement of the set has a small Lipschitz constant. Under this requirement, we show that the quasi-variational inequality has a unique…
This paper investigates leader-follower linear-quadratic stochastic graphon games, which consist of a single leader and a continuum of followers. The state equations of the followers interact through graphon coupling terms, with their…
Stackelberg games have been widely used to model interactive decision-making problems in a variety of domains such as energy systems, transportation, cybersecurity, and human-robot interaction. However, existing algorithms for solving…
We propose a novel method for planning shortest length piecewise-linear motions through complex environments punctured with static, moving, or even morphing obstacles. Using a moment optimization approach, we formulate a hierarchy of…
Leadership games provide a powerful paradigm to model many real-world settings. Most literature focuses on games with a single follower who acts optimistically, breaking ties in favour of the leader. Unfortunately, for real-world…