Related papers: Computational Efficiency Requires Simple Taxation
We consider (approximate) revenue maximization in auctions where the distribution on input valuations is given via "black box" access to samples from the distribution. We observe that the number of samples required -- the sample complexity…
We consider a task of scheduling with a common deadline on a single machine. Every player reports to a scheduler the length of his job and the scheduler needs to finish as many jobs as possible by the deadline. For this simple problem,…
This is a chapter in the Encyclopedia of Robotics. It is devoted to the study of complexity of complete (or exact) algorithms for robot motion planning. The term ``complete'' indicates that an approach is guaranteed to find the correct…
The study of mechanisms for multi-sided markets has received an increasingly growing attention from the research community, and is motivated by the numerous examples of such markets on the web and in electronic commerce. Many of these…
How does one allocate a collection of resources to a set of strategic agents in a fair and efficient manner without using money? For in many scenarios it is not feasible to use money to compensate agents for otherwise unsatisfactory…
In this work we are concerned with the design of efficient mechanisms while eliciting limited information from the agents. First, we study the performance of sampling approximations in facility location games. Our key result is to show that…
A major achievement of mechanism design theory is a general method for the construction of truthful mechanisms called VCG (Vickrey, Clarke, Groves). When applying this method to complex problems such as combinatorial auctions, a difficulty…
We study procurement games where each seller supplies multiple units of his item, with a cost per unit known only to him. The buyer can purchase any number of units from each seller, values different combinations of the items differently,…
Peer prediction mechanisms incentivize agents to truthfully report their signals even in the absence of verification by comparing agents' reports with those of their peers. In the detail-free multi-task setting, agents respond to multiple…
Weighted counting problems are a natural generalization of counting problems where a weight is associated with every computational path of polynomial-time non-deterministic Turing machines and the goal is to compute the sum of the weights…
Computational mechanics, an approach to structural complexity, defines a process's causal states and gives a procedure for finding them. We show that the causal-state representation--an $\epsilon$-machine--is the minimal one consistent with…
We study the direct-sum problem for $k$-party ``Number On the Forehead'' (NOF) deterministic communication complexity. We prove several positive results, showing that the complexity of computing a function $f$ in this model, on $\ell$…
SHAP explanations are a popular feature-attribution mechanism for explainable AI. They use game-theoretic notions to measure the influence of individual features on the prediction of a machine learning model. Despite a lot of recent…
In economic theory, an agent chooses from available alternatives -- modeled as a set. In decisions in the field or in the lab, however, agents do not have access to the set of alternatives at once. Instead, alternatives are represented by…
Data is the foundation of any scientific, industrial or commercial process. Its journey typically flows from collection to transport, storage, management and processing. While best practices and regulations guide data management and…
We study the mechanism design problem of scheduling unrelated machines and we completely characterize the decisive truthful mechanisms for two players when the domain contains both positive and negative values. We show that the class of…
We define a model of interactive communication where two agents with private types can exchange information before a game is played. The model contains Bayesian persuasion as a special case of a one-round communication protocol. We define…
We consider a game-theoretic model where individuals compete over a shared failure-prone system or resource. We investigate the effectiveness of a taxation mechanism in controlling the utilization of the resource at the Nash equilibrium…
Coalitional games are mathematical models suited to analyze scenarios where players can collaborate by forming coalitions in order to obtain higher worths than by acting in isolation. A fundamental problem for coalitional games is to single…
As modern computing moves towards smaller devices and powerful cloud platforms, more and more computation is being delegated to powerful service providers. Interactive proofs are a widely-used model to design efficient protocols for…