Related papers: Zero-sum Risk-Sensitive Stochastic Games
We consider a class of two-player zero-sum stochastic games with finite state and compact control spaces, which we call stochastic shortest path (SSP) games. They are undiscounted total cost stochastic dynamic games that have a cost-free…
In this paper, we consider a linear quadratic stochastic two-person zero-sum differential game. The controls for both players are allowed to appear in both drift and diffusion of the state equation. The weighting matrices in the performance…
We prove that for a class of zero-sum differential games with incomplete information on both sides, the value admits a probabilistic representation as the value of a zero-sum stochastic differential game with complete information, where…
It is well known that the rock-paper-scissors game has no pure saddle point. We show that this holds more generally: A symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure saddle point if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors…
We consider a zero-sum stochastic differential controller-and-stopper game in which the state process is a controlled diffusion evolving in a multi-dimensional Euclidean space. In this game, the controller affects both the drift and the…
This work considers two-player zero-sum semi-Markov games with incomplete information on one side and perfect observation. At the beginning, the system selects a game type according to a given probability distribution and informs to Player…
This paper aims to solve two fundamental problems on finite or infinite horizon dynamic games with perfect or almost perfect information. Under some mild conditions, we prove (1) the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria in general…
We consider Gillette's two-person zero-sum stochastic games with perfect information. For each $k \in \ZZ_+$ we introduce an effective reward function, called $k$-total. For $k = 0$ and $1$ this function is known as {\it mean payoff} and…
We consider zero-sum stochastic games with perfect information and finitely many states and actions. The payoff is computed by a function which associates to each infinite sequence of states and actions a real number. We prove that if the…
We study zero-sum repeated games where the minimizing player has to pay a certain cost each time he changes his action. Our contribution is twofold. First, we show that the value of the game exists in stationary strategies, depending solely…
We study best-response type learning dynamics for zero-sum polymatrix games under two information settings. The two settings are distinguished by the type of information that each player has about the game and their opponents' strategy. The…
In ergodic singular stochastic control problems, a decision-maker can instantaneously adjust the evolution of a state variable using a control of bounded variation, with the goal of minimizing a long-term average cost functional. The cost…
Mean field games model equilibria in games with a continuum of players as limiting systems of symmetric $n$-player games with weak interaction between the players. We consider a finite-state, infinite-horizon problem with two cost criteria:…
We study a problem of optimal irreversible investment and emission reduction formulated as a nonzero-sum dynamic game between an investor with environmental preferences and a firm. The game is set in continuous time on an infinite-time…
We address the problem of existence and (non-)uniqueness of solutions $\big(c,u(\cdot),\mu\big)$ to ergodic mean-field games in the whole space $\mathbb{R}^{m}$ with unbounded and merely measurable data, and for non-separable Hamiltonian.…
Nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with impulse controls offer a realistic and far-reaching modelling framework for applications within finance, energy markets, and other areas, but the difficulty in solving such problems has…
We consider the problem of computing the maximal probability of satisfying an omega-regular specification for stochastic nonlinear systems evolving in discrete time. The problem reduces, after automata-theoretic constructions, to finding…
We study the value and the optimal strategies for a two-player zero-sum optimal stopping game with incomplete and asymmetric information. In our Bayesian set-up, the drift of the underlying diffusion process is unknown to one player…
We generalize the results of Fleming and Souganidis (1989) on zero sum stochastic differential games to the case when the controls are unbounded. We do this by proving a dynamic programming principle using a covering argument instead of…
Secure equilibrium is a refinement of Nash equilibrium, which provides some security to the players against deviations when a player changes his strategy to another best response strategy. The concept of secure equilibrium is specifically…