Related papers: Pareto Optimality and Strategy Proofness in Group …
In a context where a decision has to be taken collectively by several agents, the social choice problem consists in deciding whether there exists a socially acceptable rule that aggregates the individual preferences of the agents into a…
When making a decision as a group, there are two primary paradigms: aggregating preferences (e.g. voting, mechanism design) and aggregating information (e.g. discussion, consulting, forecasting). Almost all formally-studied group…
It is well understood that the structure of a social network is critical to whether or not agents can aggregate information correctly. In this paper, we study social networks that support information aggregation when rational agents act…
An informed Advisor and an uninformed Decision-Maker, with conflicting interests, engage in repeated cheap talk communication in always new decision problems. While the Decision-Maker's optimal payoff is attainable in some subgame-perfect…
By considering rational agents, we focus on the problem of selecting goals out of a set of incompatible ones. We consider three forms of incompatibility introduced by Castelfranchi and Paglieri, namely the terminal, the instrumental (or…
This paper provides a general framework to explore the possibility of agenda manipulation-proof and proper consensus-based preference aggregation rules, so powerfully called in doubt by a disputable if widely shared understanding of Arrow's…
When aggregating Subjective Expected Utility preferences, the Pareto principle leads to an impossibility result unless the individuals have a common belief. This paper examines the source of this impossibility in more detail by considering…
Agents often have individual goals which depend on a group's actions. If agents trust a forecast of collective action and adapt strategically, such prediction can influence outcomes non-trivially, resulting in a form of performative…
This paper analyzes a society composed of individuals who have diverse sets of beliefs (or models) and diverse tastes (or utility functions). It characterizes the model selection process of a social planner who wishes to aggregate…
Autonomous software agents operating in dynamic environments need to constantly reason about actions in pursuit of their goals, while taking into consideration norms which might be imposed on those actions. Normative practical reasoning…
Complex medical reasoning has historically required frontier language models to achieve clinically-acceptable accuracy, creating computational barriers that limit deployment in resource-constrained clinical settings. We present…
Argumentation is a process of evaluating and comparing a set of arguments. A way to compare them consists in using a ranking-based semantics which rank-order arguments from the most to the least acceptable ones. Recently, a number of such…
Strategy-proof mechanisms are widely used in market design. In an abstract allocation framework where outside options are available to agents, we obtain two results for strategy-proof mechanisms. They provide a unified foundation for…
Multiplicative Kantian equilibrium explains cooperative behavior in social dilemmas without abandoning methodological individualism. However, its outcomes depend critically on the parametrization of the strategy space - the property of…
We present a review that unifies decision-support methods for exploring the solutions produced by multi-objective optimization (MOO) algorithms. As MOO is applied to solve diverse problems, approaches for analyzing the trade-offs offered by…
Nowadays, several crowdsourcing projects exploit social choice methods for computing an aggregate ranking of alternatives given individual rankings provided by workers. Motivated by such systems, we consider a setting where each worker is…
Conventional preference learning methods often prioritize opinions held more widely when aggregating preferences from multiple evaluators. This may result in policies that are biased in favor of some types of opinions or groups and…
In dialogical argumentation it is often assumed that the involved parties always correctly identify the intended statements posited by each other, realize all of the associated relations, conform to the three acceptability states (accepted,…
We consider social welfare functions that satisfy Arrow's classic axioms of independence of irrelevant alternatives and Pareto optimality when the outcome space is the convex hull of some finite set of alternatives. Individual and…
When allocating indivisible objects via lottery, planners often use ordinal mechanisms, which elicit agents' rankings of objects rather than their full preferences over lotteries. In such an ordinal informational environment, planners…