Related papers: Pareto Optimality and Strategy Proofness in Group …
Selecting a set of alternatives based on the preferences of agents is an important problem in committee selection and beyond. Among the various criteria put forth for the desirability of a committee, Pareto optimality is a minimal and…
This paper approaches the problem of understanding collective agency from a logical and game-theoretical perspective. Instead of collective intentionality, our analysis highlights the role of Pareto optimality. To facilitate the analysis,…
Given a set of conflicting arguments, there can exist multiple plausible opinions about which arguments should be accepted, rejected, or deemed undecided. We study the problem of how multiple such judgments can be aggregated. We define the…
In statistical decision theory, a model is said to be Pareto optimal (or admissible) if no other model carries less risk for at least one state of nature while presenting no more risk for others. How can you rationally aggregate/combine a…
An abstract argumentation framework can be used to model the argumentative stance of an agent at a high level of abstraction, by indicating for every pair of arguments that is being considered in a debate whether the first attacks the…
Value-based argumentation enhances a classical abstract argumentation graph - in which arguments are modelled as nodes connected by directed arrows called attacks - with labels on arguments, called values, and an ordering on values, called…
We study a general aggregation problem in which a society has to determine its position on each of several issues, based on the positions of the members of the society on those issues. There is a prescribed set of feasible evaluations,…
We study a sequence of independent one-shot non-cooperative games where agents play equilibria determined by a tunable mechanism. Observing only equilibrium decisions, without parametric or distributional knowledge of utilities, we aim to…
Reallocating resources to get mutually beneficial outcomes is a fundamental problem in various multi-agent settings. While finding an arbitrary Pareto optimal allocation is generally easy, checking whether a particular allocation is Pareto…
This paper studies a general class of social choice problems in which agents' payoff functions (or types) are privately observable random variables, and monetary transfers are not available. We consider cardinal social choice functions…
On the Web, there is always a need to aggregate opinions from the crowd (as in posts, social networks, forums, etc.). Different mechanisms have been implemented to capture these opinions such as "Like" in Facebook, "Favorite" in Twitter,…
The key contribution of the paper is a comprehensive study of the egalitarian mechanism with respect to manipulation by a coalition of agents. Our main result is that the egalitarian mechanism is, in fact, peak group strategyproof : no…
The long-standing unitary-actor assumption in strategy research -- treating firms as monolithic entities with coherent preferences -- misses that organizations are coalitions of individuals with diverse and often conflicting goals. Although…
Two important requirements when aggregating the preferences of multiple agents are that the outcome should be economically efficient and the aggregation mechanism should not be manipulable. In this paper, we provide a computer-aided proof…
In many real-life situations that involve exchanges of arguments, individuals may differ on their assessment of which supports between the arguments are in fact justified, i.e., they put forward different support-relations. When confronted…
Agents care not only about the outcomes of collective decisions but also about how decisions are made. In many cases, both the outcome and the procedure affect whether agents see a decision as legitimate, justifiable, or acceptable. We…
We study the trade-offs between strategyproofness and other desiderata, such as efficiency or fairness, that often arise in the design of random ordinal mechanisms. We use approximate strategyproofness to define manipulability, a measure to…
We examine the behavior of multi-agent networks where information-sharing is subject to a positive communications cost over the edges linking the agents. We consider a general mean-square-error formulation where all agents are interested in…
Optimization problems have been the subject of statistical physics approximations. A specially relevant and general scenario is provided by optimization methods considering tradeoffs between cost and efficiency, where optimal solutions…
During the past two decades, multi-agent optimization problems have drawn increased attention from the research community. When multiple objective functions are present among agents, many works optimize the sum of these objective functions.…