Related papers: Verifying Security Policies using Host Attributes
Byzantine fault tolerant protocols enable state replication in the presence of crashed, malfunctioning, or actively malicious processes. Designing such protocols without the assistance of verification tools, however, is remarkably…
We present a semantic framework for the deductive verification of hybrid systems with Isabelle/HOL. It supports reasoning about the temporal evolutions of hybrid programs in the style of differential dynamic logic modelled by flows or…
We propose a new symmetric cryptographic scheme based on functional invariants defined over discrete oscillatory functions with hidden parameters. The scheme encodes a secret integer through a four-point algebraic identity preserved under…
A hyperproperty relates executions of a program and is used to formalize security objectives such as confidentiality, non-interference, privacy, and anonymity. Formally, a hyperproperty is a collection of allowable sets of executions. A…
Current formal approaches have been successfully used to find design flaws in many security protocols. However, it is still challenging to automatically analyze protocols due to their large or infinite state spaces. In this paper, we…
Relational properties describe relationships that hold over multiple executions of one or more programs, such as functional equivalence. Conventional approaches for automatically verifying such properties typically rely on syntax-based,…
A security policy specifies a security property as the maximal information flow. A distributed system composed of interacting processes implicitly defines an intransitive security policy by repudiating direct information flow between…
Hybrid systems are integrations of discrete computation and continuous physical evolution. The physical components of such systems introduce safety requirements, the achievement of which asks for the correct monitoring and control from the…
This article puts forward the use of mutual information values to replicate the expertise of security professionals in selecting features for detecting web attacks. The goal is to enhance the effectiveness of web application firewalls…
We consider the problem of how to verify the security of probabilistic oblivious algorithms formally and systematically. Unfortunately, prior program logics fail to support a number of complexities that feature in the semantics and…
We develop a theory of decidable inductive invariants for an infinite-state variant of the Applied pi-calculus, with applications to automatic verification of stateful cryptographic protocols with unbounded sessions/nonces. Since the…
Network operators are often interested in verifying \emph{eventually-stable properties} of network control planes: properties of control plane states that hold eventually, and hold forever thereafter, provided the operating environment…
Current formal verification of security protocols relies on specialized researchers and complex tools, inaccessible to protocol designers who informally evaluate their work with emulators. This paper addresses this gap by embedding symbolic…
It is common to prove by reasoning over source code that programs do not leak sensitive data. But doing so leaves a gap between reasoning and reality that can only be filled by accounting for the behaviour of the compiler. This task is…
In this paper we present an efficient approach to implementing model checking in the Higher Order Logic (HOL) of Isabelle. This is a non-trivial task since model checking is restricted to finite state sets. By restricting our scope to…
Secure routing protocols for mobile ad hoc networks have been developed recently, yet, it has been unclear what are the properties they achieve, as a formal analysis of these protocols is mostly lacking. In this paper, we are concerned with…
SAFE is a clean-slate design for a highly secure computer system, with pervasive mechanisms for tracking and limiting information flows. At the lowest level, the SAFE hardware supports fine-grained programmable tags, with efficient and…
We present an algorithm to certify IP spoofing protection of firewall rulesets. The algorithm is machine-verifiably proven sound and its use is demonstrated in real-world scenarios.
We demonstrate, by a number of examples, that information-flow security properties can be proved from abstract architectural descriptions, that describe only the causal structure of a system and local properties of trusted components. We…
We focus in this paper on the problem of configuring and managing network security devices, such as Firewalls, Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnels, and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs). Our proposal is the following. First, we formally…