Related papers: Verifying Security Policies using Host Attributes
We propose a methodology for verifying security properties of network protocols at design level. It can be separated in two main parts: context and requirements analysis and informal verification; and formal representation and procedural…
To analyse cryptographic properties of distributed systems in a systematic way, a formal theory is required. In this paper, we present a theory that allows (1) to specify distributed systems formally, (2) to verify their cryptographic wrt.…
Avionics is one of the fields in which verification methods have been pioneered and brought a new level of reliability to systems used in safety critical environments. Tragedies, like the 2015 insider attack on a German airplane, in which…
We present a new and practical framework for security verification of secure architectures. Specifically, we break the verification task into external verification and internal verification. External verification considers the external…
We formally verify an algorithm for approximate policy iteration on Factored Markov Decision Processes using the interactive theorem prover Isabelle/HOL. Next, we show how the formalized algorithm can be refined to an executable, verified…
The sumcheck protocol, introduced in 1992, is an interactive proof which is a key component of many probabilistic proof systems in computational complexity theory and cryptography, some of which have been deployed. However, none of these…
Existing methods for verifying access control policies require the policy to be complete and fully determined before verification can proceed, but in practice policies are developed iteratively, composed from independently maintained…
In recent times, many protocols have been proposed to provide security for various information and communication systems. Such protocols must be tested for their functional correctness before they are used in practice. Application of formal…
Formal verification of multi-agent systems is hard, both theoretically and in practice. In particular, studies that use a single verification technique typically show limited efficiency, and allow to verify only toy examples. Here, we…
Using Isabelle/HOL, we verify a union-find data structure with an explain operation due to Nieuwenhuis and Oliveras. We devise a simpler, more naive version of the explain operation whose soundness and completeness is easy to verify. Then,…
We present a simple and concise semantics for temporal planning. Our semantics are developed and formalised in the logic of the interactive theorem prover Isabelle/HOL. We derive from those semantics a validation algorithm for temporal…
This paper investigates the algorithmic safety verification problem of infinite-state parameterized concurrent programs over a rich set of communication topologies. The goal is to automatically produce a proof of correctness in the form of…
Informal arguments that cryptographic protocols are secure can be made rigorous using inductive definitions. The approach is based on ordinary predicate calculus and copes with infinite-state systems. Proofs are generated using…
We present an executable formally verified SAT encoding of classical AI planning. We use the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL to perform the verification. We experimentally test the verified encoding and show that it can be used for reasonably…
Large systems are commonly internetworked. A security policy describes the communication relationship between the networked entities. The security policy defines rules, for example that A can connect to B, which results in a directed graph.…
A long-standing research problem in security protocol design is how to efficiently verify security protocols with tamper-resistant global states. In this paper, we address this problem by first proposing a protocol specification framework,…
Authoring access control policies is challenging and prone to misconfigurations. Access control policies must be conflict-free. Hence, administrators should identify discrepancies between policy specifications and their intended function to…
ProVerif is a widely used security protocol verifier. Internally, ProVerif uses an abstract representation of the protocol by Horn clauses and a resolution algorithm on these clauses, in order to prove security properties of the protocol or…
The paper proposes a control-theoretic framework for verification of numerical software systems, and puts forward software verification as an important application of control and systems theory. The idea is to transfer Lyapunov functions…
Cryptographic protocols aim at securing communications over insecure networks such as the Internet, where dishonest users may listen to communications and interfere with them. A secure communication has a different meaning depending on the…