Related papers: Data Injection Attacks on Smart Grids with Multipl…

The introduction of advanced communication infrastructure into the power grid raises a plethora of new opportunities to tackle climate change. This paper is concerned with the security of energy management systems which are expected to be…

We formulate a Stackelberg game between an attacker and a defender of a power system. The attacker attempts to alter the load setpoints of the power system covertly and intelligently, so that the voltage stability margin of the grid is…

Stackelberg security game models and associated computational tools have seen deployment in a number of high-consequence security settings, such as LAX canine patrols and Federal Air Marshal Service. These models focus on isolated systems…

This paper studies a multi-period demand response management problem in the smart grid where multiple utility companies compete among themselves. The user-utility interactions are modeled by a noncooperative game of a Stackelberg type where…

Applications of cyber technologies improve the quality of monitoring and decision making in smart grid. These cyber technologies are vulnerable to malicious attacks, and compromising them can have serious technical and economical problems.…

This paper investigates strategic interactions within a three party deception security game involving a defender, an insider, and external attackers. We propose a robust deception mechanism where the leader manipulates game parameters…

By utilizing tools from game theory, we develop a novel multi-period-multi-company demand response framework considering the interactions between companies (sellers of energy) and their consumers (buyers of energy). We model the…

Smart grids are vulnerable to cyber-attacks. This paper proposes a game-theoretic approach to evaluate the variations caused by an attacker on the power measurements. Adversaries can gain financial benefits through the manipulation of the…

This paper studies the resilience of second-order networked dynamical systems to strategic attacks. We discuss two widely used control laws, which have applications in power networks and formation control of autonomous agents. In the first…

This paper studies the sensor placement problem in a networked control system for improving its security against cyber-physical attacks. The problem is formulated as a zero-sum game between an attacker and a detector. The attacker's…

The pursuit of sustainability motivates microgrids that depend on distributed resources to produce more renewable energies. An efficient operation and planning relies on a holistic framework that takes into account the interdependent…

In modern transportation networks, adversaries can manipulate routing algorithms using false data injection attacks, such as simulating heavy traffic with multiple devices running crowdsourced navigation applications, to mislead vehicles…

There has been significant recent interest in game-theoretic approaches to security, with much of the recent research focused on utilizing the leader-follower Stackelberg game model. Among the major applications are the ARMOR program…

In this paper, we consider a new network security game wherein an attacker and a defender are battling over "multiple" targets. This type of game is appropriate to model many current network security conflicts such as Internet phishing,…

Attack detection is usually approached as a classification problem. However, standard classification tools often perform poorly because an adaptive attacker can shape his attacks in response to the algorithm. This has led to the recent…

Similar to a strategic interaction between rational and intelligent agents, cryptography problems can be examined through the prism of game theory. In this setting, the agent aiming to protect a message is called the defender, while the one…

The Stackelberg game depicts a leader-follower relationship wherein decisions are made sequentially, and the Stackelberg equilibrium represents an expected optimal solution when the leader can anticipate the rational response of the…

In security games, the solution concept commonly used is that of a Stackelberg equilibrium where the defender gets to commit to a mixed strategy. The motivation for this is that the attacker can repeatedly observe the defender's actions and…

This paper presents a game-theoretic framework to study the interactions of attack and defense for deep learning-based NextG signal classification. NextG systems such as the one envisioned for a massive number of IoT devices can employ deep…

This paper considers the problem of security allocation in a networked control system under stealthy attacks. The system is comprised of interconnected subsystems represented by vertices. A malicious adversary selects a single vertex on…