Related papers: Equilibrium Selection in Information Elicitation w…
The question of what global information must distributed rational agents a-priori know about the network in order for equilibrium to be possible is researched here. Until now, distributed algorithms with rational agents have assumed that…
We address the fundamental problem of selection under uncertainty by modeling it from the perspective of Bayesian persuasion. In our model, a decision maker with imperfect information always selects the option with the highest expected…
We solve for the equilibrium dynamics of information sharing in a large population. Each agent is endowed with signals regarding the likely outcome of a random variable of common concern. Individuals choose the effort with which they search…
This paper relaxes the common prior assumption in the public and private information game of Morris and Shin (2000, 2004). For the generalized game, where the agent's prior expectations are heterogenous, it derives a sharp condition for the…
Recent literature on computational notions of fairness has been broadly divided into two distinct camps, supporting interventions that address either individual-based or group-based fairness. Rather than privilege a single definition, we…
We study a problem where a group of agents has to decide how some fixed value should be shared among them. We are interested in settings where the share that each agent receives is based on how that agent is evaluated by other members of…
Proportional dynamics, originated from peer-to-peer file sharing systems, models a decentralized price-learning process in Fisher markets. Previously, items in the dynamics operate independently of one another, and each is assumed to belong…
We propose measurement integrity, a property related to ex post reward fairness, as a novel desideratum for peer prediction mechanisms in many natural applications. Like robustness against strategic reporting, the property that has been the…
In peer selection agents must choose a subset of themselves for an award or a prize. As agents are self-interested, we want to design algorithms that are impartial, so that an individual agent cannot affect their own chance of being…
Until now, distributed algorithms for rational agents have assumed a-priori knowledge of $n$, the size of the network. This assumption is challenged here by proving how much a-priori knowledge is necessary for equilibrium in different…
A rapidly growing literature on lying in behavioral economics and psychology shows that individuals often do not lie even when lying maximizes their utility. In this work, we attempt to incorporate these findings into the theory of…
An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and renegotiate. We characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication in which players have private preferences…
This paper brings the novel idea of paying the utility to the winning agents in terms of some physical entity in cooperative communications. Our setting is a secret two-way communication channel where two transmitters exchange information…
A fundamental result in mechanism design theory, the so-called revelation principle, asserts that for many questions concerning the existence of mechanisms with a given outcome one can restrict attention to truthful direct…
Modern decision making tools are based on statistical analysis of abundant data, which is often collected by querying multiple individuals. We consider data collection through crowdsourcing, where independent and self-interested agents,…
Reputation mechanisms offer an effective alternative to verification authorities for building trust in electronic markets with moral hazard. Future clients guide their business decisions by considering the feedback from past transactions;…
We study the problem of fairly and truthfully allocating $m$ indivisible items to $n$ agents with additive preferences. Specifically, we consider truthful mechanisms outputting allocations that satisfy EF$^{+u}_{-v}$, where, in an…
Persuasion studies how an informed principal may influence the behavior of agents by the strategic provision of payoff-relevant information. We focus on the fundamental multi-receiver model by Arieli and Babichenko (2019), in which there…
An informed seller designs a dynamic mechanism to sell an experience good. The seller has partial information about the product match, which affects the buyer's private consumption experience. We characterize equilibrium mechanisms of this…
This paper studies mechanism design environments in which the designer does not know the distribution of agents' private information a priori and instead learns from agents' behavior induced by the mechanism itself. We formalize a notion of…