Related papers: Stochastic evolutionary dynamics of minimum-effort…
Game-theoretic techniques and equilibria analysis facilitate the design and verification of competitive systems. While algorithmic complexity of equilibria computation has been extensively studied, practical implementation and application…
Establishing the existence of Nash equilibria for partially observed stochastic dynamic games is known to be quite challenging, with the difficulties stemming from the noisy nature of the measurements available to individual players…
In this paper, we study the problem of cost optimisation of individual-based institutional incentives (reward, punishment, and hybrid) for guaranteeing a certain minimal level of cooperative behaviour in a well-mixed, finite population. In…
Humans are bounded rational at best and this, we argue, has worked in their favour in the hunter-gatherer society where emergence of a coordinated action, leading to cooperation, is otherwise the standard stag-hunt dilemma (when individuals…
Evolutionary game dynamics describes the spreading of successful strategies in a population of reproducing individuals. Typically, the microscopic definition of strategy spreading is stochastic, such that the dynamics becomes deterministic…
Over the past few decades, many works have studied the evolutionary dynamics of continuous games. However, previous works have primarily focused on two-player games with pairwise interactions. Indeed, group interactions rather than pairwise…
Recent empirical studies suggest that heavy-tailed distributions of human activities are universal in real social dynamics [Muchnik, \emph{et al.}, Sci. Rep. \textbf{3}, 1783 (2013)]. On the other hand, community structure is ubiquitous in…
The serious games between humans and AI have only just begun. Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) models the competitive and cooperative strategies of biological entities. EGT could help predict the potential evolutionary equilibrium of humans…
Coevolutionary dynamics is investigated in chemical catalysis, biological evolution, social and economic systems. The dynamics of these systems can be analyzed within the unifying framework of evolutionary game theory. In this Letter, we…
The positive impact of cooperative bots on cooperation within evolutionary game theory is well documented; however, existing studies have predominantly used discrete strategic frameworks, focusing on deterministic actions with a fixed…
Evolutionary game theory has traditionally assumed that all individuals in a population interact with each other between reproduction events. We show that eliminating this restriction by explicitly considering the time scales of interaction…
This research investigates the impact of dynamic, time-varying interactions on cooperative behaviour in social dilemmas. Traditional research has focused on deterministic rules governing pairwise interactions, yet the impact of interaction…
Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations is known to fixate eventually in the absence of mutation. We here show that a similar phenomenon can be found in stochastic game dynamical batch learning, and investigate fixation in learning…
Evolutionary game theory has proved to be a powerful tool to probe the self-organisation of collective behaviour by considering frequency-dependent fitness in evolutionary processes. It has shown that the stability of a strategy depends not…
We study the problem of stochastic stability for evolutionary dynamics under the logit choice rule. We consider general classes of coordination games, symmetric or asymmetric, with an arbitrary number of strategies, which satisfies the…
Designing protocols enhancing cooperation for multi-agent systems remains a grand challenge. Cheap talk, defined as costless, non-binding communication before formal action, serves as a pivotal solution. However, existing theoretical…
When group members claim a portion of limited resources, it is tempting to invest more effort to get a larger share. However, if everyone acts similarly, they all get the same piece they would obtain without extra effort. This is the…
To our knowledge, the populations are generally assumed to be homogeneous in the traditional approach to evolutionary game dynamics. Here, we focus on the inhomogeneous populations. A simple model which can describe the inhomogeneity of the…
In this paper, we study analytically the statistics of the number of equilibria in pairwise social dilemma evolutionary games with mutation where a game's payoff entries are random variables. Using the replicator-mutator equations, we…
Complex social behaviors lie at the heart of many of the challenges facing evolutionary biology, sociology, economics, and beyond. For evolutionary biologists in particular the question is often how such behaviors can arise \textit{de novo}…