Related papers: Nonzero-Sum Risk Sensitive Stochastic Games for Co…

We consider a class of nonsmooth aggregative games over networks in stochastic regimes, where each player is characterized by a composite cost function $f_i+r_i$, $f_i$ is a smooth expectation-valued function dependent on its own strategy…

We initiate the study of how to perturb the reward in a zero-sum Markov game with two players to induce a desirable Nash equilibrium, namely arbitrating. Such a problem admits a bi-level optimization formulation. The lower level requires…

In this article, we study a discounted stochastic game to model resource optimal intrusion detection in wireless sensor networks. To address the problem of uncertainties in various network parameters, we propose a globalized robust game…

We first study an optimal stopping problem in which a player (an agent) uses a discrete stopping time in order to stop optimally a payoff process whose risk is evaluated by a (non-linear) $g$-expectation. We then consider a non-zero-sum…

We study a class of two-player zero-sum stochastic games known as \textit{blind stochastic games}, where players neither observe the state nor receive any information about it during the game. A central concept for analyzing long-duration…

We consider ergodic backward stochastic differential equations, in a setting where noise is generated by a countable state uniformly ergodic Markov chain. We show that for Lipschitz drivers such that a comparison theorem holds, these…

We consider graphical $n$-person games with perfect information that have no Nash equilibria in pure stationary strategies. Solving these games in mixed strategies, we introduce probabilistic distributions in all non-terminal positions. The…

In this paper we consider stopping problems for continuous-time Markov chains under a general risk-sensitive optimization criterion for problems with finite and infinite time horizon. More precisely our aim is to maximize the certainty…

We address cost identification in a finite-horizon linear quadratic Gaussian game. We characterize the set of cost parameters that generate a given Nash equilibrium policy. We propose a backpropagation algorithm to identify the time-varying…

Probabilistic model checking for stochastic games enables formal verification of systems that comprise competing or collaborating entities operating in a stochastic environment. Despite good progress in the area, existing approaches focus…

We study a class of dynamic decision problems of mean field type with time inconsistent cost functionals, and derive a stochastic maximum principle to characterize subgame perfect Nash equilibrium points. Subsequently, this approach is…

Several notions of game enjoy a Nash-like notion of equilibrium without guarantee of existence. There are different ways of weakening a definition of Nash-like equilibrium in order to guarantee the existence of a weakened equilibrium.…

In this study, we present models where participants strategically select their risk levels and earn corresponding rewards, mirroring real-world competition across various sectors. Our analysis starts with a normal form game involving two…

We consider stochastic differential games with $N$ nearly identical players, linear-Gaussian dynamics, and infinite horizon discounted quadratic cost. Admissible controls are feedbacks for which the system is ergodic. We first study the…

We propose a toy model for a stochastic description of the competition between two athletes of unequal strength, whose average strength difference is represented by a parameter $d$. The athletes interact through the choice of their…

This paper presents a pioneering investigation into discrete-time two-person non-zero-sum linear quadratic (LQ) stochastic games with random coefficients. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of open-loop Nash…

In this paper we introduce the concept of split Nash equilibrium problems associated with two related noncooperative strategic games. Then we apply the Fan-KKM theorem to prove the existence of solutions to split Nash equilibrium problems…

Noncooperative game theory provides a normative framework for analyzing strategic interactions. However, for the toolbox to be operational, the solutions it defines will have to be computed. In this paper, we provide a single reduction that…

This paper focuses on a kind of linear quadratic non-zero sum differential game driven by backward stochastic differential equation with asymmetric information, which is a natural continuation of Wang and Yu [IEEE TAC (2010) 55: 1742-1747,…

The paper is concerned with a variant of the continuous-time finite state Markov game of control and stopping where both players can affect transition rates, while only one player can choose a stopping time. We use the dynamic programming…