Related papers: The Mysteries of Security Games: Equilibrium Compu…
We study an optimal targeting problem for super-modular games with binary actions and finitely many players. The considered problem consists in the selection of a subset of players of minimum size such that, when the actions of these…
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) have created new security challenges for critical infrastructures due to their stealthy, dynamic, and adaptive natures. In this work, we aim to lay a game-theoretic foundation by establishing a multi-stage…
Inspired by scenarios where the strategic network design and defense or immunisation are of the central importance, Goyal et al. [3] defined a new Network Formation Game with Attack and Immunisation. The authors showed that despite the…
In an adversarial environment, a hostile player performing a task may behave like a non-hostile one in order not to reveal its identity to an opponent. To model such a scenario, we define identity concealment games: zero-sum stochastic…
In this paper, we first consider a pinning node selection and control gain co-design problem for complex networks. A necessary and sufficient condition for the synchronization of the pinning controlled networks at a homogeneous state is…
Network congestion games are a well-understood model of multi-agent strategic interactions. Despite their ubiquitous applications, it is not clear whether it is possible to design information structures to ameliorate the overall experience…
While Nash equilibrium in extensive-form games is well understood, very little is known about the properties of extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE), both from a behavioral and from a computational point of view. In this setting,…
The overall aim of our research is to develop techniques to reason about the equilibrium properties of multi-agent systems. We model multi-agent systems as concurrent games, in which each player is a process that is assumed to act…
When securing complex infrastructures or large environments, constant surveillance of every area is not affordable. To cope with this issue, a common countermeasure is the usage of cheap but wide-ranged sensors, able to detect suspicious…
The increasing prevalence of security attacks on software-intensive systems calls for new, effective methods for detecting and responding to these attacks. As one promising approach, game theory provides analytical tools for modeling the…
Many packing, scheduling and covering problems that were previously considered by computer science literature in the context of various transportation and production problems, appear also suitable for describing and modeling various…
For common notions of correlated equilibrium in extensive-form games, computing an optimal (e.g., welfare-maximizing) equilibrium is NP-hard. Other equilibrium notions -- communication (Forges 1986) and certification (Forges & Koessler…
$S$ equilibrium synthesizes a century of game-theoretic modeling. $S$-beliefs determine choices as in the refinement literature and level-$k$, without anchoring on Nash equilibrium or imposing ad hoc belief formation. $S$-choices allow for…
This paper studies a strategic security problem in networked control systems under stealthy false data injection attacks. The security problem is modeled as a bilateral cognitive security game between a defender and an adversary, each…
There has been a recent surge of interest in the role of information in strategic interactions. Much of this work seeks to understand how the realized equilibrium of a game is influenced by uncertainty in the environment and the information…
Games with incomplete preferences are an important model for studying rational decision-making in scenarios where players face incomplete information about their preferences and must contend with incomparable outcomes. We study the problem…
The stag hunt (or assurance game) is a simple game that has been used as a prototype of a variety of social coordination problems (ranging from the social contract to the adoption of technical standards). Players have the option to either…
In game theory, mechanism design is concerned with the design of incentives so that a desired outcome of the game can be achieved. In this paper, we explore the concept of equilibrium design, where incentives are designed to obtain a…
We study multiplayer quantitative reachability games played on a finite directed graph, where the objective of each player is to reach his target set of vertices as quickly as possible. Instead of the well-known notion of Nash equilibrium…
A checkers-like model game with a simplified set of rules is studied through extensive simulations of agents with different expertise and strategies. The introduction of complementary strategies, in a quite general way, provides a tool to…