Related papers: Analyzing Games with Ambiguous Player Types using …

We study a very general class of games --- multi-dimensional aggregative games --- which in particular generalize both anonymous games and weighted congestion games. For any such game that is also large, we solve the equilibrium selection…

We study discrete-time, finite-state mean-field games (MFGs) under model uncertainty, where agents face ambiguity about the state transition probabilities. Each agent maximizes its expected payoff against the worst-case transitions within…

This paper examines the integration of computational complexity into game theoretic models. The example focused on is the Prisoner's Dilemma, repeated for a finite length of time. We show that a minimal bound on the players' computational…

The classical, complete-information two-player games assume that the problem data (in particular the payoff matrix) is known exactly by both players. In a now famous result, Nash has shown that any such game has an equilibrium in mixed…

Traditional game theory assumes that the players in the game are aware of the rules of the game. However, in practice, often the players are unaware or have only partial knowledge about the game they are playing. They may also have…

Fairness is a desirable and crucial property of many protocols that handle, for instance, exchanges of message. It states that if at least one agent engaging in the protocol is honest, then either the protocol will unfold correctly and…

This paper considers an infinitely repeated three-player Bayesian game with lack of information on two sides, in which an informed player plays two zero-sum games simultaneously at each stage against two uninformed players. This is a…

Von Neumann's Min-Max Theorem guarantees that each player of a zero-sum matrix game has an optimal mixed strategy. This paper gives an elementary proof that each player has a near-optimal mixed strategy that chooses uniformly at random from…

We explore a version of the minimax theorem for two-person win-lose games with infinitely many pure strategies. In the countable case, we give a combinatorial condition on the game which implies the minimax property. In the general case, we…

We study a general class of dynamic games with asymmetric information where agents' beliefs are strategy dependent, i.e. signaling occurs. We show that the notion of sufficient information, introduced in the companion paper team, can be…

In this paper, we address a robust nonlinear state estimation problem under model uncertainty by formulating a dynamic minimax game: one player designs the robust estimator, while the other selects the least favorable model from an…

Using the duality techniques introduced by De Meyer (1996a, 1996b), De Meyer and Marino (2005) provided optimal strategies for both players in finitely repeated games with incomplete information on two sides, in the independent case. In…

In this paper, we study a non-linear filtering problem in the presence of signal model uncertainty. The model ambiguity is characterized by a class of probability measures from which the true one is taken. After interchanging the order of…

Standard game theory assumes that the structure of the game is common knowledge among players. We relax this assumption by considering extensive games where agents may be unaware of the complete structure of the game. In particular, they…

We consider perfect-information reachability stochastic games for 2 players on infinite graphs. We identify a subclass of such games, and prove two interesting properties of it: first, Player Max always has optimal strategies in games from…

We study linear-quadratic games of incomplete information with Gaussian uncertainty, where each player's payoff depends on a privately observed type and a common state. The designer observes the state, elicits types, and sells action…

In this article, we consider mean field games between a dominating player and a group of representative agents, each of which acts similarly and also interacts with each other through a mean field term being substantially influenced by the…

Game-theoretic probability uses the structure of gambles to define a concept like probability, but which is more flexible and robust. We show that results in game-theoretic probability can be thought of as minimax theorems for specific…

Partial-monitoring games constitute a mathematical framework for sequential decision making problems with imperfect feedback: The learner repeatedly chooses an action, opponent responds with an outcome, and then the learner suffers a loss…

In classical game theory, optimal strategies are determined for games with complete information; this requires knowledge of the opponent's goals. We analyze games when a player is mistaken about their opponents goals. For definitiveness, we…