Related papers: Computational Aspects of Private Bayesian Persuasi…
The hidden-action model captures a fundamental problem of principal-agent theory and provides an optimal sharing rule when only the outcome but not the effort can be observed. However, the hidden-action model builds on various explicit and…
We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires \emph{multiple} agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a…
We study the incentivized information acquisition problem, where a principal hires an agent to gather information on her behalf. Such a problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game between the principal and the agent, where the principal…
In this article, we relax the Bayesianity assumption in the now-traditional model of Bayesian Persuasion introduced by Kamenica & Gentzkow. Unlike preexisting approaches -- which have tackled the possibility of the receiver (Bob) being…
We consider a social planner faced with a stream of myopic selfish agents. The goal of the social planner is to maximize the social welfare, however, it is limited to using only information asymmetry (regarding previous outcomes) and cannot…
We consider a group of Bayesian agents who try to estimate a state of the world $\theta$ through interaction on a social network. Each agent $v$ initially receives a private measurement of $\theta$: a number $S_v$ picked from a Gaussian…
A Bayesian player acting in an infinite multi-player game learns to predict the other players' strategies if his prior assigns positive probability to their play (or contains a grain of truth). Kalai and Lehrer's classic grain of truth…
We develop efficient algorithms to construct utility maximizing mechanisms in the presence of risk averse players (buyers and sellers) in Bayesian settings. We model risk aversion by a concave utility function, and players play…
We address the fundamental problem of selection under uncertainty by modeling it from the perspective of Bayesian persuasion. In our model, a decision maker with imperfect information always selects the option with the highest expected…
We introduce a model of persuasion in which a sender without any commitment power privately gathers information about an unknown state of the world and then chooses what to verifiably disclose to a receiver. The receiver does not know how…
We define a model of interactive communication where two agents with private types can exchange information before a game is played. The model contains Bayesian persuasion as a special case of a one-round communication protocol. We define…
We study public persuasion when a sender communicates with a large audience that can fact-check at heterogeneous costs. The sender commits to a public information policy before the state is realized, but any verifiable claim she makes after…
Political and advertising campaigns increasingly exploit social networks to spread information and persuade people. This paper studies a persuasion model to examine whether such a strategy is better than simply sending public signals.…
We study a regularized variant of the Bayesian Persuasion problem, where the receiver's decision process includes a divergence-based penalty that accounts for deviations from perfect rationality. This modification smooths the underlying…
The intuition that profit is optimized by maximizing marginal revenue is a guiding principle in microeconomics. In the classical auction theory for agents with linear utility and single-dimensional preferences, Bulow and Roberts (1989) show…
This paper considers a distributed adaptive optimization problem, where all agents only have access to their local cost functions with a common unknown parameter, whereas they mean to collaboratively estimate the true parameter and find the…
Many multi-agent interaction scenarios can be naturally modeled as noncooperative games, where each agent's decisions depend on others' future actions. However, deploying game-theoretic planners for autonomous decision-making requires a…
Recent advances in computing power and the potential to make more realistic assumptions due to increased flexibility have led to the increased prevalence of simulation models in economics. While models of this class, and particularly…
A typical viral marketing model identifies influential users in a social network to maximize a single product adoption assuming unlimited user attention, campaign budgets, and time. In reality, multiple products need campaigns, users have…
In this paper, we study some multiagent variants of the knapsack problem. Fluschnik et al. [AAAI 2019] considered the model in which every agent assigns some utility to every item. They studied three preference aggregation rules for finding…