Related papers: RowHammer: Reliability Analysis and Security Impli…

The purpose of this document is to study the security properties of the Silver Bullet algorithm against worst-case RowHammer attacks. We mathematically demonstrate that Silver Bullet, when properly configured and implemented in a DRAM chip,…

The Rowhammer vulnerability poses an increasing challenge with newer generations of DRAM and aggressive technology scaling. Existing mitigation techniques, such as Graphene, Twice, and Hydra, primarily rely on tracking activation counts for…

Recent advancements in side-channel attacks have revealed the vulnerability of modern Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) to malicious adversarial weight attacks. The well-studied RowHammer attack has effectively compromised DNN performance by…

The security vulnerabilities due to Rowhammer have worsened over the last decade, with existing in-DRAM solutions, such as TRR, getting broken with simple patterns. In response, the DDR5 specifications have been extended to support Per-Row…

To understand and improve DRAM performance, reliability, security and energy efficiency, prior works study characteristics of commodity DRAM chips. Unfortunately, state-of-the-art open source infrastructures capable of conducting such…

Our ISCA 2013 paper provides a fundamental empirical understanding of two major factors that make it very difficult to determine the minimum data retention time of a DRAM cell, based on the first comprehensive experimental characterization…

Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) is the prevalent memory technology used to build main memory systems of almost all computers. A fundamental shortcoming of DRAM is the need to refresh memory cells to keep stored data intact. DRAM refresh…

As recently emerged rowhammer exploits require undocumented DRAM address mapping, we propose a generic knowledge-assisted tool, DRAMDig, which takes domain knowledge into consideration to efficiently and deterministically uncover the DRAM…

As Dynamic Random Access Memories (DRAM) scale, they are becoming increasingly susceptible to Row Hammer. By rapidly activating rows of DRAM cells (aggressor rows), attackers can exploit inter-cell interference through Row Hammer to flip…

Vulnerabilities emanating from DRAM errors pose a vexing problem that remains, as of yet, unsolved and elusive but cannot be ignored. Prior defenses focused on specific details of early RowHammer attacks and fail to generalize with the…

The aggressive scaling of technology may have helped to meet the growing demand for higher memory capacity and density, but has also made DRAM cells more prone to errors. Such a reality triggered a lot of interest in modeling DRAM behavior…

Rowhammer is a hardware security vulnerability at the heart of every system with modern DRAM-based memory. Despite its discovery a decade ago, comprehensive defenses remain elusive, while the probability of successful attacks grows with…

This paper summarizes our work on experimentally characterizing, mitigating, and recovering read disturb errors in multi-level cell (MLC) NAND flash memory, which was published in DSN 2015, and examines the work's significance and future…

A fundamental assumption in software security is that memory contents do not change unless there is a legitimate deliberate modification. Classical fault attacks show that this assumption does not hold if the attacker has physical access.…

In recent years, Rowhammer has attracted significant attention from academia and industry alike. This technique, first published in 2014, flips bits in memory by repeatedly accessing neighbouring memory locations. Since its discovery,…

Microarchitectural vulnerabilities increasingly undermine the assumption that hardware can be treated as a reliable root of trust. Prevention mechanisms often lag behind evolving attack techniques, leaving deployed systems unable to assume…

It has become increasingly difficult to understand the complex interaction between modern applications and main memory, composed of DRAM chips. Manufacturers are now selling and proposing many different types of DRAM, with each DRAM type…

We present the first rigorous security, performance, energy, and cost analyses of the state-of-the-art on-DRAM-die read disturbance mitigation method, Per Row Activation Counting (PRAC), described in JEDEC DDR5 specification's April 2024…

Due to the globalization in the semiconductor supply chain, counterfeit dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) chips/modules have been spreading worldwide at an alarming rate. Deploying counterfeit DRAM modules into an electronic system can…

In cloud computing environments, multiple tenants are often co-located on the same multi-processor system. Thus, preventing information leakage between tenants is crucial. While the hypervisor enforces software isolation, shared hardware,…