Related papers: The Shapley Value in the Knaster Gain Game
Following the original interpretation of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953a) as a priori evaluation of the prospects of a player in a multi-person interaction situation, we propose a group value, which we call the Shapley group value, as a…
We investigate the application of the Shapley value to quantifying the contribution of a tuple to a query answer. The Shapley value is a widely known numerical measure in cooperative game theory and in many applications of game theory for…
We study a class of probabilistic cooperative games which can be treated as an extension of the classical cooperative games with transferable utilities. The coalitions have an exogenous probability of being realized. This probability…
We study a cooperative game setting where the grand coalition may change since the initial players can invite more players. We focus on monotone games, i.e., adding more players to the grand coalition is not harmful. We model the invitation…
Lloyd Shapley's cooperative value allocation theory stands as a central concept in game theory, extensively utilized across various domains to distribute resources, evaluate individual contributions, and ensure fairness. The Shapley value…
In cooperative games with transferable utilities, the Shapley value is an extreme case of marginalism while the Equal Division rule is an extreme case of egalitarianism. The Shapley value does not assign anything to the non-productive…
Over the last few years, the Shapley value, a solution concept from cooperative game theory, has found numerous applications in machine learning. In this paper, we first discuss fundamental concepts of cooperative game theory and axiomatic…
The Shapley value is the prevalent solution for fair division problems in which a payout is to be divided among multiple agents. By adopting a game-theoretic view, the idea of fair division and the Shapley value can also be used in machine…
This study introduces the \emph{edge-based Shapley value}, a novel allocation rule within cooperative game theory, specifically tailored for networked systems, where value is generated through interactions represented by edges. Traditional…
We show that any cooperative game can be represented by an assignment of costly facilities to players, in which it is intuitively obvious how to allocate the total cost in an equitable manner. This equitable solution turns out to be the…
The Shapley value---probably the most important normative payoff division scheme in coalitional games---has recently been advocated as a useful measure of centrality in networks. However, although this approach has a variety of real-world…
Shapley value is originally a concept in econometrics to fairly distribute both gains and costs to players in a coalition game. In the recent decades, its application has been extended to other areas such as marketing, engineering and…
One of the long-debated issues in coalitional game theory is how to extend the Shapley value to games with externalities (partition-function games). When externalities are present, not only can a player's marginal contribution - a central…
Various peer-to-peer energy markets have emerged in recent years in an attempt to manage distributed energy resources in a more efficient way. One of the main challenges these models face is how to create and allocate incentives to…
This paper concerns the analysis of the Shapley value in matching games. Matching games constitute a fundamental class of cooperative games which help understand and model auctions and assignments. In a matching game, the value of a…
Facility location games have been a topic of major interest in economics, operations research and computer science, starting from the seminal work by Hotelling. Spatial facility location models have successfully predicted the outcome of…
In cooperative games, we study how values created or costs incurred by a coalition are shared among the members within it, and the players may join the coalition in a online manner such as investors invest a startup. Recently, Ge et al.…
In this dissertation, we analyze the computational properties of game-theoretic centrality measures. The key idea behind game-theoretic approach to network analysis is to treat nodes as players in a cooperative game, where the value of each…
Attribution scores can be applied in data management to quantify the contribution of individual items to conclusions from the data, as part of the explanation of what led to these conclusions. In Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning,…
The Shapley value is one of the most important solution concepts in cooperative game theory. In coalitional games without externalities, it allows to compute a unique payoff division that meets certain desirable fairness axioms. However, in…