Related papers: Breaking Symmetric Cryptosystems using Quantum Per…
In symmetric cryptanalysis, the model of superposition queries has led to surprising results, with many constructions being broken in polynomial time thanks to Simon's period-finding algorithm. But the practical implications of these…
The advent of quantum computing poses a significant threat to the foundational cryptographic algorithms that secure modern digital communications. Protocols such as HTTPS, digital certificates, and public key infrastructures (PKIs) heavily…
The development of large quantum computers will have dire consequences for cryptography. Most of the symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic algorithms are vulnerable to quantum algorithms. Grover's search algorithm gives a square root time…
We present new connections between quantum information and the field of classical cryptography. In particular, we provide examples where Simon's algorithm can be used to show insecurity of commonly used cryptographic symmetric-key…
Quantum computers, that may become available one day, would impact many scientific fields, most notably cryptography since many asymmetric primitives are insecure against an adversary with quantum capabilities. Cryptographers are already…
The advent of quantum computing poses a profound threat to traditional cryptographic systems, exposing vulnerabilities that compromise the security of digital communication channels reliant on RSA, ECC, and similar classical encryption…
We study quantum period finding algorithms such as Simon and Shor (and its variants Eker{\aa}-H{\aa}stad and Mosca-Ekert). For a periodic function $f$ these algorithms produce -- via some quantum embedding of $f$ -- a quantum superposition…
Shor's quantum factoring algorithm and a few other efficient quantum algorithms break many classical crypto-systems. In response, people proposed post-quantum cryptography based on computational problems that are believed hard even for…
Quantum computing (QC) holds the promise of revolutionizing problem-solving by exploiting quantum phenomena like superposition and entanglement. It offers exponential speed-ups across various domains, from machine learning and security to…
Attacks on classical cryptographic protocols are usually modeled by allowing an adversary to ask queries from an oracle. Security is then defined by requiring that as long as the queries satisfy some constraint, there is some problem the…
The prospective emergence of large-scale quantum computers capable of executing Shor's algorithm at cryptographically relevant scale would render widely deployed public-key cryptography computationally insecure. Under this threat model,…
Simon's algorithm is a polynomial period-finding algorithm that has been used to exploit the algebraic structure of specific symmetric ciphers, showing that exponential speedups in their cryptanalysis are theoretically possible. While the…
Simon's problem plays an important role in the history of quantum algorithms, as it inspired Shor to discover the celebrated quantum algorithm solving integer factorization in polynomial time. Besides, the quantum algorithm for Simon's…
Large-scale quantum computing is a significant threat to classical public-key cryptography. In strong "quantum access" security models, numerous symmetric-key cryptosystems are also vulnerable. We consider classical encryption in a model…
Shor's algorithm efficiently solves factoring and discrete logarithm problems using quantum computers, compromising all public key schemes used today. These schemes rely on assumptions on their computational complexity, which quantum…
We present the first complete implementation of the offline Simon's algorithm, and estimate its cost to attack the MAC Chaskey, the block cipher PRINCE and the NIST lightweight candidate AEAD scheme Elephant. These attacks require a…
With the advancement of quantum computing, symmetric cryptography faces new challenges from quantum attacks. These attacks are typically classified into two models: Q1 (classical queries) and Q2 (quantum superposition queries). In this…
Recent results of Kaplan et al., building on previous work by Kuwakado and Morii, have shown that a wide variety of classically-secure symmetric-key cryptosystems can be completely broken by quantum chosen-plaintext attacks (qCPA). In such…
Classical forgery attacks against Offset Two-round (OTR) structures require some harsh conditions, such as some plaintext and ciphertext pairs need to be known, and the success probability is not too high. To solve these problems, a quantum…
With the advent of quantum computing, cryptocurrencies that rely on blockchain technology face mounting cryptographic vulnerabilities. This paper presents a comprehensive literature review evaluating how quantum algorithms, specifically…