Related papers: FPTAS for Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria in Tree G…

Learning by experience in Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) is a difficult and exciting task, due to the lack of stationarity of the environment, whose dynamics evolves as the population learns. In order to design scalable algorithms for systems…

Exploiting the algebraic structure of the set of bimatrix games, a divide-and-conquer algorithm for finding Nash equilibria is proposed. The algorithm is fixed-parameter tractable with the size of the largest irreducible component of a game…

In this paper, we explore aggregative games over networks of multi-integrator agents with coupled constraints. To reach the general Nash equilibrium of an aggregative game, a distributed strategy-updating rule is proposed by a combination…

Many efficient algorithms have been designed to recover Nash equilibria of various classes of finite games. Special classes of continuous games with infinite strategy spaces, such as polynomial games, can be solved by semidefinite…

This paper presents a new distributed algorithm that leverages heavy-ball momentum and a consensus-based gradient method to find a Nash equilibrium (NE) in a class of non-cooperative convex games with unconstrained action sets. In this…

Bargaining networks model social or economic situations in which agents seek to form the most lucrative partnership with another agent from among several alternatives. There has been a flurry of recent research studying Nash bargaining…

In this work, we investigate the distributed generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) seeking problems for $N$-coalition games with inequality constraints. First, we study the scenario where each agent in a coalition has full information of all…

AI in Math deals with mathematics in a constructive manner so that reasoning becomes automated, less laborious, and less error-prone. For algorithms, the question becomes how to automate analyses for specific problems. For the first time,…

We propose the first loss function for approximate Nash equilibria of normal-form games that is amenable to unbiased Monte Carlo estimation. This construction allows us to deploy standard non-convex stochastic optimization techniques for…

Rosenthal (1973) introduced the class of congestion games and proved that they always possess a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Fotakis et al. (2005) introduce the notion of a greedy strategy tuple, where players sequentially and…

We present a computational formulation for the approximate version of several variational inequality problems, investigating their computational complexity and establishing PPAD-completeness. Examining applications in computational game…

Although it has been known since the 1970s that a globally optimal strategy profile in a common-payoff game is a Nash equilibrium, global optimality is a strict requirement that limits the result's applicability. In this work, we show that…

We provide a complete characterization for uniqueness of equilibria in unconstrained polymatrix games. We show that while uniqueness is natural for coordination and general polymatrix games, zero-sum games require that the dimension of the…

Reinforcement learning for multi-agent games has attracted lots of attention recently. However, given the challenge of solving Nash equilibria for large population games, existing works with guaranteed polynomial complexities either focus…

This paper studies approximate solutions to large-scale linear quadratic stochastic games with homogeneous nodal dynamics parameters and heterogeneous network couplings within the graphon mean field game framework in [2]-[4]. A graphon…

A strategy profile in a multi-player game is a Nash equilibrium if no player can unilaterally deviate to achieve a strictly better payoff. A profile is an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium if no player can gain more than $\epsilon$ by…

We investigate the complexity of bounding the uncertainty of graphical games, and we provide new insight into the intrinsic difficulty of computing Nash equilibria. In particular, we show that, if one adds very simple and natural additional…

We propose a Fully Polynomial-Time Approximation Scheme (FPTAS) for stochastic dynamic programs with multidimensional action, scalar state, convex costs and linear state transition function. The action spaces are polyhedral and described by…

This paper proposes a distributed algorithm to find the Nash equilibrium in a class of non-cooperative convex games with partial-decision information. Our method employs a distributed projected gradient play approach alongside consensus…

We develop a probabilistic approach to continuous-time finite state mean field games. Based on an alternative description of continuous-time Markov chain by means of semimartingale and the weak formulation of stochastic optimal control, our…