Related papers: Autocratic strategies for alternating games
Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations has been extensively explored in past decades. However, most previous studies assume that payoffs of individuals are fully determined by the strategic behaviors of interacting parties and…
In this paper we present results and analyses of a class of games in which heterogeneous agents are rewarded for being in a minority group. Each agent possesses a number of fixed strategies each of which are predictors of the next minority…
Human decision behaviour is quite diverse. In many games humans on average do not achieve maximal payoff and the behaviour of individual players remains inhomogeneous even after playing many rounds. For instance, in repeated prisoner…
Evolutionary game theory is a successful mathematical framework geared towards understanding the selective pressures that affect the evolution of the strategies of agents engaged in interactions with potential conflicts. While a…
Evolution occurs in populations of reproducing individuals. Reproduction depends on the payoff a strategy receives. The payoff depends on the environment that may change over time, on intrinsic uncertainties, and on other sources of…
In the realm of evolutionary game theory, standard frameworks typically presuppose that every player possesses comprehensive knowledge and unrestricted access to the entire strategy space. However, real-world human society inherently…
Probabilistic game structures combine both nondeterminism and stochasticity, where players repeatedly take actions simultaneously to move to the next state of the concurrent game. Probabilistic alternating simulation is an important tool to…
We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game, where besides unconditional cooperation and defection, tit-for-tat, win-stay-lose-shift and extortion are the five competing strategies. While pairwise imitation…
Infinitely repeated games support equilibrium concepts beyond those present in one-shot games (e.g., cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma). Nonetheless, repeated games fail to capture our real-world intuition for settings with many…
Tit-for-Tat strategy is a strategy in repeated two-player symmetric games which imitates the previous action of the opponent. We show that the Tit-for-Tat strategy is a zero-determinant strategy, which unilaterally equalizes the expected…
We consider an autonomous navigation problem, whereby a traveler aims at traversing an environment in which an adversary tries to set an ambush. A two players zero sum game is introduced. Players' strategies are computed as random path…
We present a systematic investigation of the quantum games, constructed using a novel repeated game protocol, when played repeatedly ad infinitum. We focus on establishing that such repeated games -- by virtue of inherent quantum-mechanical…
We construct two models of discrete-time replicator dynamics with time delay. In the social-type model, players imitate opponents taking into account average payoffs of games played some units of time ago. In the biological-type model, new…
A periodic behavior is a well observed phenomena in biological and economical systems. We show that evolutionary games on graphs with imitation dynamics can display periodic behavior for an arbitrary choice of game theoretical parameters…
According to the evolutionary game theory principle, a strategy representing a higher payoff can spread among competitors. But there are cases when a player consistently overestimates or underestimates her own payoff, which undermines…
The game theoretic concepts of rationalizability and iterated dominance are closely related and provide characterizations of each other. Indeed, the equivalence between them implies that in a two player finite game, the remaining set of…
Two-player games have had a long and fruitful history of applications stretching across the social, biological, and physical sciences. Most applications of two-player games assume synchronous decisions or moves even when the games are…
A common assumption employed in most previous works on evolutionary game dynamics is that every individual player has full knowledge about and full access to the complete set of available strategies. In realistic social, economical, and…
We establish a theoretical framework to address evolutionary dynamics of spatial games under strong selection. As the selection intensity tends to infinity, strategy competition unfolds in the deterministic way of winners taking all. We…
Artificial agents are typically oriented to the realization of an externally assigned task and try to optimize over secondary aspects of plan execution such time lapse or power consumption, technically displaying a quasi-dichotomous…