Related papers: Godel's Second Incompleteness Theorem for Definabl…
In this paper, we provide a fairly general self-reference-free proof of the Second Incompleteness Theorem from Tarski's Theorem of the Undefinability of Truth.
We first partly develop a mathematical notion of stable consistency intended to reflect the actual consistency property of human beings. Then we give a generalization of the first and second G\"odel incompleteness theorem to stably…
This work is motivated by the problem of finding the limit of the applicability of the first incompleteness theorem ($\sf G1$). A natural question is: can we find a minimal theory for which $\sf G1$ holds? We examine the Turing degree…
We investigate sentences which are simultaneously partially conservative over several theories. First, we generalize Bennet's results on this topic to the case of more than two theories. In particular, for any finite family $\{T_i\}_{i \leq…
We discuss an incompleteness result proven by Bezboruah and Shepherdson. This result tells us that the weak theory ${\sf PA}^-$ does not prove the consistency of any theory (under certain assumptions explained in the paper). Kreisel argued…
Although the categorical arithmetic is not effectively axiomatizable, the belief that the incompleteness Theorems can be apply to it is fairly common. Furthermore, the so-called "essential" (or "inherent") semantic incompleteness of the…
In this paper, we examine the limit of applicability of G\"{o}del's first incompleteness theorem ($\sf G1$ for short). We first define the notion "$\sf G1$ holds for the theory $T$". This paper is motivated by the following question: can we…
This proof of Godel's first incompleteness theorem doesn't require omega-consistency, nor does it refer to codes of negated sentences as in Rosser's. It begins from where Godel's usual proof ends, and stalks it till it ends proving it.
The famous G\"odel incompleteness theorem states that for every consistent sufficiently rich formal theory T there exist true statements that are unprovable in T. Such statements would be natural candidates for being added as axioms, but…
We give a new proof for Godel's second incompleteness theorem, based on Kolmogorov complexity, Chaitin's incompleteness theorem, and an argument that resembles the surprise examination paradox. We then go the other way around and suggest…
We consider Presburger arithmetic extended by the sine function, call this extension sine-Presburger arithmetic ($\sin$-PA), and systematically study decision problems for sets of sentences in $\sin$-PA. In particular, we detail a decision…
The celebrated Trakhtenbrot's theorem states that the set of finitely valid sentences of first-order logic is not computably enumerable. In this note we will extend this theorem by proving that the finite satisfiability problem of any…
Fixing some computably enumerable theory $T$, the Friedman-Goldfarb-Harrington (FGH) theorem says that over elementary arithmetic, each $\Sigma_1$ formula is equivalent to some formula of the form $\Box_T \varphi$ provided that $T$ is…
A $G$-invariant version of definable Tietze extension theorem for definably complete structures is proved when a definably compact definable topological group $G$ acts definably and continuously on the definable set.
In an earlier paper, "Omega-inconsistency in Goedel's formal system: a constructive proof of the Entscheidungsproblem" (math/0206302), I argued that a constructive interpretation of Goedel's reasoning establishes any formal system of…
There have been many generalizations of Shoenfield's Theorem on the absoluteness of $\Sigma^1_2$ sentences between uncountable transitive models of $\mathrm{ZFC}$. One of the strongest versions currently known deals with $\Sigma^2_1$…
The famous G\"odel incompleteness theorem says that for every sufficiently rich formal theory (containing formal arithmetic in some natural sense) there exist true unprovable statements. Such statements would be natural candidates for being…
Standard interpretations of Goedel's "undecidable" proposition, [(Ax)R(x)], argue that, although [~(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable if [(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable, we may not conclude from this that [~(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable. We show that such…
We prove the following version of the first incompleteness theorem that simultaneously strengthens Mostowski's theorem and Vaught's theorem: For any c.e. family $\{ T_i \}_{i \in \omega}$ of consistent extensions of Tarski, Mostowski and…
We distinguish finitarily between algorithmic verifiability, and algorithmic computability, to show that Goedel's 'formally' unprovable, but 'numeral-wise' provable, arithmetical proposition [(Ax)R(x)] can be finitarily evidenced as:…